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ARTICLE
PARADISE LOST, PARADIGM FOUND:
REDEFINING THE JUDICIARY'S

IMPERILED ROLE IN CONGRESS
CHmLES GARDNER GEYH*

Long perceived as acting in splendid isolation,the legislativeand judicialbranches
have become increasingly intertwined. The judiciary is becoming more nvolved in
the legislativeprovince of statutory reform, and Congresshas inserted itself more
frequently into the judicial territoryof proceduralrulemaking. In thisArticle, Professor Geyh observes that a new, interactiveparadigm has replaced the perceived
model of separation and delegation between the brandies. As the judiciary and
Congresshave grown more enmeshed, the judiciary'sreputation has suffered, both
from a Watergate-vintagemistrustof all thingsgovernmental andfrom a perception
thatjudicialactivism is born of self-interest Rather than seeking to untie the Gordian knot created by increasingjudicial-legislativeinteraction, ProfessorGeyh advocates taking this interplay to a higher,more systematized level He proposes die
creation of an Interbranch Commission on Law Reform and the Judiciary. Composed primarily of representatives from the judicial, legislative, and executive
branches, the Interbranch Commission would review statutoryproposals affecting
the judiciaryas well asproceduralrule reforms. ProfessorGeyh acknowledges hiat
there are no "one-trick pony" solutions to the problems caused by interbranchinteraction,but he offers the Interbranch Commission as a novel way of dealing with
the new paradigm.
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INTRODUCTION

Watergate and Vietnam took their toll on the institutions of
American government. The Vietnam War, wrote Russell Baker,
"turned us into a people who know we can't believe anybody anymore, including ourselves."' "After Watergate," observed political
analyst William Snyder, "many Americans suddenly found themselves
capable of believing the worst about their leaders; not just Richard
Nixon, but any president, and not just the president, but any public
official."'2 In the years since, public cynicism has deepened as the
President and members of Congress have lurched from one mess to
the next: Abscam, the Iran-Contra affair, the House check-writing
scandal, Whitewater, the Waco raid.
Throughout this assault on the competence and credibility of the
first two branches of government, the judiciary has maintained a low
profile and escaped relatively unscathed. That, however, may be
changing. In the wake of public frustration with the management of
the Rodney King and O.J. Simpson trials, commentators have begun
to suggest that post-Watergate cynicism is finally catching up with the
judiciary. 3 Although such a conclusion may be premature and unnecessarily alarmist, there is legitimate cause for concern-not on the basis of public reaction to one or two isolated trials, but in light of a
series of recent attacks on the judiciary's credibility arising out of the
judiciary's changing extrajudicial role in the legislative and rulemaking processes.
Other commentators have explored the judiciary's place in statutory reform and rulemaking and have identified any number of
problems:4 judges and legislators do not always communicate enough
1 John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility at v (1993) (quoting Russell Baker).

2 Disillusionment Began Pre-Watergate (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 23, 1994),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNN File, Transcript No. 311-6.

3 For example, a recent commentator on the OJ. Simpson trial noted that "the fear, of
course, is that the court system-long a bulwark of American pride, especially in the postWatergate, post-Vietnam era-would now come in for the same shellacking that's trashed
the presidency and Congress." Michael H. Hodges, America on Trial, Detroit News, Apr.
15, 1995, at 1C.
4 A nice summary of some of these identified failings is included in Richard L Marcus,
Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 Brook. L Rev. 761,
762-67 (1993).
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on matters of mutual concern, 5 or sometimes communicate too much; 6
Congress has asserted too much power over the judiciary in some instances, 7 whereas the judiciary has asserted too much influence over
Congress in others; 8 the judiciary is making too many national rules
too precipitously 9 but has embarked on a joint venture with Congress
to balkanize procedure and thereby end national rulemaking as we
know it.10 Isolated solutions have been offered by some to fix these

isolated failings, only to be rejected by others as inadequate to resolve
different but no less isolated failings.
Piecemeal reforms are inevitably inadequate because the challenges confronting the judiciary in the statutory and rulemaking
arenas are not the result of isolated defects, but arise out of an unappreciated yet fundamental transformation of the judiciary's lawmaking role in the past generation." Once this transformation is
understood, it becomes clear that a more comprehensive approach is
necessary to address adequately the issues surrounding the judiciary's
involvement in the statutory and rulemaking processes. It is the purpose of this Article to illuminate and explain this transformation, to
describe a new paradigm within which scholars, judges, and legislators
should operate, and to propose the composite solutions necessary to
acclimate the judiciary to the new model.
Judges have always played an important extrajudicial role in the
legislative process by proposing, drafting, testifying on, and lobbying
for and against innumerable proposals regulating or affecting federal
5 See Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in Judges and Legislators: Toward Institutional Comity 7, 7-15 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) [hereinafter Judges and
Legislators] (discussing inability of Congress and judiciary to communicate effectively and
consequences thereof).
6 See J. Clark Kelso, Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions on Extrajudicial Speech by
Judges, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 851, 862-65 (1995) (arguing against judges becoming too involved in legislative process).
7 See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 795, 837-55 (1991) (criticizing politicization of
rulemaking, as evidenced by heightened congressional activity).
8 See Christopher E. Smith, Judicial Self-Interest: Federal Judges and Court Administration 1-11 (1995) (discussing motivations and capabilities of judiciary to influence
legislation).
9 See Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 841, 841-42 (1993) (lamenting Supreme Court's abdication of
rulemaking oversight); Laurens Walker, Avoiding Surprise from Federal Civil Rule Making: The Role of Economic Analysis, 23 J. Legal Stud. 569, 569-72 (1994) (asserting that
surprise in rulemaking evidences system failure).
10 See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 Ariz. St. L.J. 1393, 1402-03 (1992) (discussing how judiciary helped Congress Increase fragmentation of rulemaking).

11For purposes of this Article, references to the judiciary's role in "lawmaking" or "law
reform" encompass its subsidiary roles in rulemaking and statutory/legislative reform.
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court operations. Over the course of the past twenty-five years, however, the judiciary's participation in statutory reform has increased
dramatically.' 2 In part it has been a matter of necessity, as judges
have felt the pinch of crowded dockets and seen no alternative to petitioning Congress with proposed solutions no one else will offer. In
part it has been a matter of making virtue of necessity, as judges have
been encouraged to communicate their insights and concerns to Congress, on the grounds that interbranch communication makes a valua13
ble contribution to intelligent, conscientious lawmaking.
In rulemaking, likewise, the past twenty-five years have witnessed
a startling transformation of the judiciary's role. The Rules Enabling
Act of 193414 envisioned procedural rulemaking as an essentially technical undertaking best left in the expert hands of judges, and for
nearly forty years thereafter, the judiciary exercised effectively exclusive rulemaking power.' 5 That ended in 1973, when Congress suspended the proposed Rules of Evidence. Since then, Congress has
remained actively involved in procedural rulemaking, frequently
amending rules proposed or previously promulgated by the judiciary
and thereby heightening appreciably the level of interaction between
16
the first and third branches.
This changing role of the judiciary in the legislative and rulemaking processes calls for a paradigmatic shift in our understanding of the
relationship between Congress and the courts, a shift in which interaction replaces separation and delegation as the defining feature. Part I
of this Article describes and explains the transformation that underlies
the need for a new, interactive paradigm of the judge-legislator relationship in statutory reform and rulemaking.
As interaction between the branches has increased, judges, legislators, and outside observers have begun to wonder how far it should
go: What are the limits of the judiciary's new, extrajudicial, lawmaking role? It is largely unexplored territory, as discovered by a pair of
commentators who recently lamented that "[n]o clear models of the
appropriate role of a judge's participation in the legislative process
emerge from the scant published materials or from our own inquiries
of jurists around the country.' 7 Parts II and Il seek to fill this void.
In Part II, I explore the constitutional, statutory, and ethical conSee infra notes 44-84 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
14 Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994)).
15 See infra notes 100-13 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 114-31 and accompanying text.
17 Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for Legislators
and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1045, 1085 (1991).
12
13
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straints on judges' extrajudicial participation in lawmaking. Although
these are the most commonly identified constraints, they are ultimately of limited significance in terms of the restrictions they impose
on the judiciary's ability to participate in and influence the development of statutes and rules.
Prudential constraints, on the other hand, are another matter,
and Part III investigates these. Federal judges lack many of the weapons at the disposal of other lobbyists. Their ability to persuade members of Congress in the legislative process and command the respect of
litigants in the adjudicative process is linked to their reputation for
competence, credibility, and impartiality. In defining the outer limits
of the judiciary's appropriate role under a new, interactive paradigm,
then, a key prudential constraint is that the judiciary avoid tactics and
interactions that could damage the reputation that fuels its influence.
That is easier said than done. By increasing the level of their interaction with legislators, judges have become a target of what might
best be characterized as post-Watergate cynicism. The judiciary's
heightened participation in statutory reform has caused some commentators and members of Congress to label the judiciary's motives as
self-interested and to counsel against legislative deference to the judiciary's recommendations. 18 In the case of rulemaking, a similar perception that the judiciary cannot be counted upon to promulgate
public-serving, as opposed to self-serving, procedural rules has fueled
the drive toward greater legislative intervention (and consequently,
more judge-legislator interaction). 19
The judiciary is in a precarious position. It has little choice but to
remain actively engaged in the statutory and rulemaking processes.
To withdraw would be to cede such functions entirely to Congress,
which lacks the expertise to regulate court operations competently,
and which is often under political pressure to compromise the health
and well-being of the judiciary in the service of other priorities. By
remaining actively engaged, however, the judiciary risks exacerbating
public skepticism that threatens the judiciary's credibility. The judiciary therefore finds itself in a paradox of sorts. It must be a part of the
legislative and rulemaking processes because its day-to-day experience with court administration and procedure makes it a uniquely
competent and qualified source of information indispensable to intelligent decisionmaking. When the judiciary participates in such
processes, however, the information it imparts may be discounted or
ignored because the judiciary's day-to-day experience with court adSee infra notes 209-35 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 114-31 and accompanying text.
18
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ministration and procedure makes it a self-interested, and therefore
potentially unreliable, source.
If one accepts the essential tenets of the new paradigm-that interbranch interaction is necessary and desirable-the process of reform must begin by developing avenues of escape from the
competence-credibility paradox, so that the judiciary can continue to
exercise an active and influential role in lawmaking with a minimum
of damage to its institutional credibility. The key to unlocking the
paradox lies in the judiciary remaining a part of the political fray while
appearing to stay above it. In the past, the judiciary has utilized a
number of conflict-avoidance devices that have enabled it to contribute to, yet distance itself from, the lawmaking process. These mechanisms may no longer be adequate to the task, however, as increased
interaction between the branches has precipitated a proliferation of
credibility-threatening interbranch confrontations. In Part IV, I explore these conflict-avoidance mechanisms and how they might be improved. Aided by innovative, if piecemeal, proposals developed by
others operating within the old paradigm, I have constructed a multipart reform proposal aimed at restoring and preserving the judiciary's influential lawmaking role in a new, interactive paradigm.
Central to the proposal is the creation of an Interbranch Commission
on Law Reform and the Judiciary, designed to facilitate meaningful
but less confrontational exchanges of information among the branches
of government.
I
Tim

CHANGING ROLE OF THE JuDICIcARY IN THE

DEVELOPMENT OF STATUTES AND

RuLs

The extrajudicial role of judges in statutory and rule reform has
been two hundred years in the making. To understand why the events
of the past generation are properly characterized as calling for the
formulation of a new paradigm, we must look to the historical development of the judge-legislator relationship by exploring the judiciary's
developing roles, first in statutory reform and then in rule reform.
A.

The Judiciary'sRole in Statutory Reform

The judiciary's interaction with Congress on matters of statutory
reform can be divided into three distinct periods: "unstructured interaction," which began with the first Congress in 1789; "formalized interaction," which began with the creation of the Judicial Conference
of the United States in 1922; and "expanded interaction," which began
with the establishment of the Federal Judicial Center in 1967.
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Unstructured Interaction: 1789-1922

During the first decade of the Republic, individual Supreme
Court justices proposed legislation, assisted congressional committees
in developing amendments to the Judiciary Act of 1789, and lobbied
for a variety of other legislative reforms.20 Peter Fish, in his definitive
history of federal judicial administration, chronicled the efforts of numerous judges and justices who proposed, drafted, testified on, and
wrote letters in support of court-related legislation throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.2 ' Although no longer the
exclusive, or even the primary, vehicle for interbranch communication, individual judges, acting on their own initiative, correspond with
legislators on matters of statutory and rule reform to the present
day. 2
2. FormalizedInteraction: 1922-1966
In 1922, Congress established the Conference of Senior Circuit
Judges, thanks to the lobbying efforts of Chief Justice William Howard
Taft.23 Renamed the Judicial Conference of the United States in
1948,24 the Conference is headed by the Chief Justice and is composed
entirely of federal judges, who together serve as the governing body of
the federal judiciary.25 The enabling statute provides that the "Chief
Justice shall submit to Congress an annual report of the proceedings
20 See Maeva Marcus & Emily Field Van Tassel, Judges and Legislators in the New
Federal System, in Judges and Legislators, supra note 5, at 31, 36-42 (discussing interaction
between judges, Congress, and President during 1790s): see also Russell R. Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123, 125-31 (observing that framers intended judiciary to participate in legislative lawmaking).
21 See Peter G. Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration 11, 14-17, 24-32
(1973) (detailing judicial efforts in lobbying for congressional reform of judiciary); see also
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 21-22, 36, 76-77,
96-97, 110 (1928) (referring to direct and indirect communications between judges and
legislators on matters of court reform).
22 An excellent example is the legislation that divided the former Fifth Circuit into the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. The tireless efforts of individual judges to influence the passage or defeat of circuit-splitting legislation is carefully chronicled in Deborah J. Barrow &
Thomas G. Walker, A Court Divided: The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Politics
of Judicial Reform (1988).
23 See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 331 (1994)); see also Fish, supra note 21, at 30-32 (describing Chief Justice Taft's
lobbying efforts).
24 See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 331, 62 Stat. 869, 902 (codified as amended at 28

U.S.C. § 331 (1994)).

25 Originally, the Conference included only the Chief Justice and the senior most circuit
judge from each circuit. See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, § 2, 42 Stat. at 838. In its current form,
the Judicial Conference is composed of the Chief Justice, the chief circuit judges (seniority
no longer being dispositive), a district judge from each circuit, and the Chief Judge of the
Court of International Trade. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994).
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of the Judicial Conference and its recommendations for legislation,"'

6

and the Conference has, since its inception, included legislative pro-

posals in its annual report. 27
In assessing the impact of the Judicial Conference on judge-legislator interaction in the legislative process, however, one finds that the
annual report is the tip of the iceberg. Proposals advocated in the
annual report are first considered by one or more Judicial Conference
committees28 that act upon issues called to their attention by, among
others, legislators.2 9 Legislators solicit comments and testimony from

Conference committee members on pending bills that the committee
has reviewed both before and after the Conference as a whole has
voted on them.30 After the Judicial Conference has voted on reforms
26 28 U.S.C. § 331. Although it was not until 1948 that Congress amended the statute
to require the Conference to present annual recommendations for legislative reform to
Congress, such recommendations were made as a matter of custom before then. See Fish,
supra note 21, at 301.
27 As Judge Elmo Hunter explained it to a congressional committee:
The 1924 Conference focussed Congressional attention on the inadequacy of
certain court law libraries. As a result, $165,000 was appropriated the following year.

In later years the Conference brought up such matters as the need for
qualified legal secretaries, for funds for incidental expenses of travel, the need
for a greater number of law clerks, and for funds to more adequately staff the
clerks' offices. All these matters received Congressional attention as a result
of Conference efforts.
Judicial Conference of the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1983) (testimony of Judge Elmo B. Hunter); see also Fish. supra note
21, at 65-69 (discussing early Judicial Conference reports).
There are numerous examples of recent court reform legislation that began their journey into law with a Judicial Conference recommendation. See Court Reform and Access
to Justice Act: Hearings on H.R.3152 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st &
2d Sess. 18,21-22 (1987-1988) [hereinafter Court Reform and Access Hearings] (testimony
of Judge Elmo B. Hunter) (discussing eliminating Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction
and amending Rules Enabling Act); H.R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982,5988 (citing measures repealing "civil priorities" provisions following Judicial Conference criticism).
28 Judicial Conference committees, like congressional committees, are organized along
subject matter lines. For a list of the standing committees of the Judicial Conference, see
Administration of the Federal Judiciary- Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual
Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 54-59 app. C (1991) [hereinafter Federal Judiciary Administration Hearing] (testimony of Judge Charles Clark). In addition, the Conference creates ad hoc committees, as
needed, to address particular problems. See Elmo B. Hunter, The Judicial Conference and
Its Committee on Court Administration 8-9 (1986).
29 See Hunter, supra note 28, at 12.
30 The impact of Judicial Conference testimony on the legislative process clearly can be
seen in the numerous bills revised to meet Judicial Conference concerns. See, e.g., H.R.
Rep. No. 515, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1990) (limiting application of Multiparty, Mul-
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of particular interest to the judiciary, Conference committee chairs
will write, telephone, or visit key legislators to clarify or urge adoption
of the Conference's position.31
Seventeen years after it established the Judicial Conference, Congress passed the Administrative Office Act of 1939.32 The Act dramatically expanded the points of interaction between the judiciary and
Congress, most notably through the creation of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, which the Act placed within the
control of the Judicial Conference. 33 First, the Administrative Office
replaced the Department of Justice as the source of the judiciary's
administrative support, meaning that henceforth the judiciary would
communicate directly with Congress rather than through the executive branch on its budget and related matters. 34 Second, the Act required the Administrative Office Director to submit annual reports to
Congress concerning the business of the courts.3 5 Third, and perhaps
most important, the Act instructed the Director to "[p]erform such
other duties as may be assigned to him by the Supreme Court or the
Judicial Conference of the United States." 36 Such "other duties" have
come to include playing a significant role in the legislative process. 37
tiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1990 to suits arising out of single accidents after "Judicial Conference and others... expressed concern over application of the consolidation procedures
provided for in this bill, to products liability or toxic exposure cases"); H.R. Rep. No. 732,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1990) (modifying Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 to make
certain case-management criteria advisory because establishing mandatory criteria was
"objectionable to the judicial branch, and the Committee [was] unwilling to impose the
Congress' view of proper case management upon an unwilling judiciary").
31 For example, the House hearing record on the Court Reform and Access to Justice
Act of 1988 included six letters from Judicial Conference representatives to the House
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice, which were sent after Conference members testified at hearings. See Court Reform and Access Hearings, supra note 27, at 901-17.
32 Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28, 48

U.S.C.).
33 See id. Judicial Conference control over the Administrative Office is assured by 28
U.S.C. § 601 (1994), which gives the Chief Justice the power to hire and fire the Administrative Office Director "after consulting with the Judicial Conference."
34 See Michael J. Remington, Circuit Council Reform: A Boat I-look for Judges and
Court Administrators, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 695,709-10 (discussing congressional objectives
met by Administrative Office Act of 1939).
35 See Administrative Office Act of 1939, § 305, 53 Stat. at 1224 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1994)). The reporting requirement has been expanded over time so
that the Director's report must now address the state of the business of Article III courts,
see 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(3) (1994), bankruptcy courts, see id. § 604(a)(13), and magistrate
judges, see id. § 604(d)(3), the impact of the savings and loan crisis on the courts, see Id.
§ 604(a)(24), and the number, nature, and disposition of disciplinary complaints against
judges, see id. § 604(h)(2).
36 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(24).
37 At the urging of the 1952 Judicial Conference, Congress began to solicit the judiciary's views on legislation of interest to the third branch through the auspices of the Admin-
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For example, Administrative Office staff drafts legislative text to
implement proposals approved by the Judicial Conference and supplies such text to members of Congress for introduction as bills? 8 The
staff monitors legislation of interest to the Judicial Conference, including but not limited to legislation that it has drafted, and lobbies Con39
gress in support of positions taken by the Judicial Conference.
Finally, the Administrative Office Director frequently testifies before
congressional committees at oversight and legislative hearings. 4
In addition to creating the Administrative Office, the Administrative Office Act established circuit judicial councils to govern the affairs of the individual judicial circuits. 41 Although not charged with
any responsibilities that would place them in direct contact with Congress,42 the circuit chief judges, who chair the councils, occasionally

istrative Office. See Special Session Report of Judicial Conference, in Report of the
Judicial Conference of the United States 22 app. (1952) (expressing "earnest hope" that
Congress would consult Administrative Office on pertinent legislative matters); see also
Fish, supra note 21, at 207.
38 Indeed, the Administrative Office's statutory drafting services have become so routine that its occasional failure to provide such services has invited criticism from legislators.
Robert W. Kastenmeier, then chairman of the House subcommittee with jurisdiction over
the federal courts, and Michael J. Remington, then his chief counsel, criticized the Judicial
Conference for "sometimes recommend[ing] legislative reforms in its report on its proceedings, but then never submit[ting] draft implementing legislation to Congress." Robert
W. Kastenmeier & Michael J.Remington, A Judicious Legislator's Lexicon to the Federal
Judiciary, in Judges and Legislators, supra note 5, at 54, 84. Kastenmeier and Remington
complained that when the judiciary delayed presenting its legislative proposals until the
last moment, when they could be considered only as amendments to other bills pending on
the House floor, the net effect was to undermine the legislative process. See id. at 84-85.
In other words, the subcommittee depended upon the judiciary to supply it with statutory
text for the reforms it recommended; if the judiciary did not do so, the reforms would not
receive subcommittee consideration independently.
39 See id. at 63 (describing legislative affairs office as "charged with diverse liaison responsibilities, including the formulation of the Judicial Conference's legislative program
and the presentation and promotion of the program to Congress"); see also Fish, supra
note 21, at 208-09 (discussing the "steady stream" of information flowing between Administrative Office staff and Congress).
40 See, e.g., Administration of the Federal Judiciary- Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 75-76 (1991) (testimony of L. Ralph Mecham); District Court Organization: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1990)
[hereinafter District Court Organization Hearing] (same).
41 See Administrative Office Act of 1939, § 306, 53 Stat. at 1224.
42 For a list of the statutes identifying the judicial councils' many responsibilities, see
Charles Gardner Geyh, Means of Judicial Discipline Other than Those Prescribed by the
Judicial Discipline Statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 372(c), in 1 Research Papers of the National
Commission on Judicial Discipline & Removal 713 app. B (National Comm'n on Judicial
Discipline & Removal ed., 1993).
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communicate with legislators directly on matters within a given cir43
cuit's particular interest or expertise.
3. Expanded Interaction: 1967-Present
Over the course of the preceding two phases, the judiciary remained actively engaged in the formulation and implementation of
legislation. Throughout that period, however, individual judges and
legislators sought an even more interactive relationship between Congress and the judiciary. Constitutional convention delegates entertained several proposals to formalize an extrajudicial role for
members of the third branch.44 Chief among them was James
Madison's proposal for a council of revision, to be comprised of the
President and a number of federal judges, that would have the "authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall
45
operate."
In 1921, then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo echoed complaints lodged
by British and American scholars over the course of the preceding
century, that the "[legislature and courts move on in proud and silent
'46
isolation. Some agency must be found to mediate between them.
Judge Cardozo proposed creating a Ministry of Justice, comprised of
at least five members-including a judge-that would monitor statutory law and recommend reforms on a continuing basis. 47 The
Cardozo proposal has been resurrected in modified form several times
since, with and without a judicial participation component, and has
48
been implemented successfully on the state level.
In the latter third of this century, many judges, legislators, and
other commentators have taken up where Justice Cardozo left off, re43 See Fish, supra note 21, at 207 n.34 (noting that "legislation establishing new places
of holding court went to circuit councils"). For a more recent example, see District Court
Organization Hearing, supra note 40, at 361 (letter from Alfred T. Goodwin, Chief Judge,
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, to Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier (discussing legislation to split Ninth Circuit)).
44 For an excellent summary of such proposals and the debate surrounding them, see
Wheeler, supra note 20, at 125-31.
45 1 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention 21 (rev. ed. 1937).
46 Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 114 (1921).
47 See id. at 124-25.
48 For examples of resurrections of the Cardozo proposal, see Henry J. Friendly, The
Gap in Law Making-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 Colum. L. Rev.
787, 802-07 (1963); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev.
995, 1011-17 (1987); Arthur J. Keeffe, Twenty-Nine Distinct Damnations of the Federal
Practice-and a National Ministry of Justice, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 636, 636-38 (1954). The successful implementation of the Cardozo proposal is discussed in Larry Kramer, "The OneEyed are Kings": Improving Congress's Ability to Regulate the Use of Judicial Resources,
Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1991, at 73, 92-93.
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newing pleas for increased interaction between the branches. 49 The
catalyst: dramatic increases in the demands placed on the judiciary by
the legislative branch, which has systematically expanded the courts'
federal question jurisdiction in search of solutions to the nation's social problems, and by the executive branch, which made the federal
courts a battlefield for prosecuting the so-called "wars" on drugs and
street crime.50 Some of those advocating more judge-legislator communication therefore have focused on the need to sensitize legislators
to the impact of their actions on an overburdened judiciary.51 Others
have dwelled upon the special expertise that judges can lend legislators on the complexities of court improvement.5 Still others have
49 See Federal Judiciary Administration Hearing, supra note 28, at 106 (statement of
Subcommittee Chairman William J. Hughes) ("I do not subscribe to this old theory that
there should not be that communication to maintain the independence of the judiciary. I
think, if anything, we need to increase that communication so that we understand one
another's problems."). See generally Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 17, at 1048-50
(considering proposals to improve institutional structures affecting legislative-judicial relations); Building Bridges Instead of Walls: Fostering Communication Between Judges and
Legislators, 75 Judicature 167 passim (1991) [hereinafter Building Bridges] (transcript of
panel discussion of American Judicature Society (Aug. 10, 1991)) (assessing current state
of legislative-judicial relations and exploring ways to improve interbranch communications); Mark W. Cannon & Warren L Cikins, Interbranch Cooperation in Improving the
Administration of Justice: A Major Innovation, 38 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1. 19-20 (1981)
(reflecting on success of Williamsburg Conferences attended by leaders of three branches
of federal government); Frank M. Coffin, Communication Among the Three Branches:
Can the Bar Serve as Catalyst?, 75 Judicature 125 (1991) (asserting that the bar can serve
as catalyst for opening new lines of communication among branches, ensuring continued
effective administration of justice); Robert A. Katzmann, Introduction, in Judges and Legislators, supra note 5, at 1, 1-6 (discussing inclusion of judicial-congressional affairs in longterm agenda of U.S. Judicial Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch); Kramer.
supra note 48, at 78-81 (discussing causes and effects of inadequate planning to ensure
efficient use of judicial resources).
50 See Robert W. Kastenmeier & Charles Gardner Geyh, The Case in Support of Legislation Facilitating the Consolidation of Mass-Accident Litigation: A View from the Legislature, 73 Marq. L. Rev. 535, 543-46 (1990) (discussing impact of drug prosecutions on
court congestion); see also Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History
of Federal Judicial Service-and Disservice-1789-1992,142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 333,340 (1993)
(discussing impact of increases in federal courts' jurisdiction on growth of judiciary).
51 See Frank M. Coffin, The Federalist Number 86: On Relations Between the Judiciary and Congress, in Judges and Legislators, supra note 5, at 21, 22 ("The judiciary and
Congress not only do not communicate with each other on their most basic concerns; they
do not know how they may properly do so. Legislators enact laws without considering
either their burden on courts or how they might be interpreted."); Robert A. Katzmann,
Summary of Proceedings, in Judges and Legislators, supra note 5, at 162, 163 (quoting
Justice Scalia's observation that "Congress may not 'know the extent of the difficulties that
it's imposing on the federal courts"'); Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, Project
Seeks to Improve Communications Between Courts and Legislatures, 75 Judicature 45,45
(1991) ("Congress may pass laws without adequate thought about their effect on the judicial workload, or fail to address issues that the courts must then confront .... ").
52 See Barrow & Walker, supra note 22, at 249 ("[P]olicy formulation begins with the
identification of a problem needing correction or a condition requiring improvement. The

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1165

suggested the need for judges to acquire a greater appreciation for the
constraints within which Congress operates in the judicial reform
arena. 53
These more recent calls for heightened interbranch communication have yielded significant results in the federal system. Whereas
the first two phases in the development of the judiciary's role in the
legislative process were triggered by single, specific events-the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and the creation of the Judicial Conference, respectively 54-the third phase was not. As described below, it
was the product of a confluence of initiatives within the public and
private sectors, beginning with the establishment of the Federal Judicial Center.
a. Statutory Initiatives. Congress established the Federal Judicial Center in 1967, at the instigation of the Judicial Conference. 55
The Center was created primarily to augment the judiciary's research
capabilities and to provide judicial education.5 6 In pursuing these
objectives, the Center created a new conduit for interbranch communication. It published materials on legislative reform proposals that
reached not only judges but legislators as well;57 and it served as a
primary responsibility for identifying such situations lies with members of the judicial
branch, as federal judges clearly are in the best position to detect institutional problems
that warrant attention."); Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Renewing the Relationship, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 279, 279 (1991) ("The complexities of the law-making and lawinterpreting tasks in the third century of this republic cry out for systematic dialogue between those who make and those who interpret legislation.").
53 As Katzmann notes:
Assessing the third branch's perceptions of Congress, Ralph Mecham of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts commented that "the difficulty is that
many members of the judiciary don't understand some of the key issues.
They're not aware of some of the nuances." Steven Ross, the general counsel
to the Clerk of the House of Representatives, who represents the chamber in
court, stated that there is "an incredible degree of ignorance as to how the
legislative branch operates ......
See Katzmann, supra note 51, at 163.
54 See supra notes 20-43 and accompanying text.
55 See Russell R. Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of Judicial Administration: Creating the Federal Judicial Center, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1988, at 31,
38-41 (outlining establishment of Federal Judicial Center).
56 See id. at 41-43. In addition, Congress directed the Center to investigate ways in
which automatic data processing could be utilized by the courts. See id.
57 See, e.g., Rules Enabling Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. 10 (1983-1984) [hereinafter Rules Enabling Act Hearings] (testimony of
Judge Edward T. Gignoux) (providing subcommittee with copy of Federal Judicial Center
publication on Rules Enabling Act for use in drafting amendments to Rules Enabling Act).
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think tank, of sorts, for the judiciary, which made its director a logical
witness in legislative hearings on bills affecting the judiciary. s
Congress also created several court reform commissions of finite
duration, one objective of which has been to exploit the judiciary's
expertise in order to improve legislation affecting the courts. In 1972,
for example, Congress formed the Commission on Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System.5 9 The Commission, composed of
judges and legislators, was created to explore the issue of circuit realignment, with a particular focus on the Fifth Circuit.60
In 1988, Congress established the Federal Courts Study Committee, commissioning it to "examine problems and issues currently fac61
ing the courts of the United States" and to make recommendations.
The Committee, whose members were selected by the Chief Justice,
included five federal judges and four members of Congress. 62
In 1991, Congress created the National Commission on Judicial
Discipline and Removal to "investigate and study the problems and
issues involved in the tenure (including discipline and removal) of an
Article Ill judge," to "evaluate the advisability of proposing alternatives to current arrangements with respect to such problems," and to
submit a report to each branch of government.63 The Commission,
whose members were selected by the President, the Chief Justice, the
Speaker of the House, and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate,
64
included two federal judges and three members of Congress.
b. IntrajudicialInitiatives. For its part, the judiciary either supported or acquiesced in the foregoing congressional initiatives. In ad58 See, e.g., Judicial Independence: Discipline and Conduct: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 86-103 (1989) (testimony of John C.
Godbold, Director, Federal Judicial Center) (discussing judicial discipline legislation).
59 See Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 41 (1994)).
60 See Roman L. Hruska, The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System: A Legislative History, 1974 Ariz. St. LJ.579,579-82 (discussing creation of Com-

mission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System to address issues of circuit
realignment in Fifth and Ninth Circuits). See generally Barrow & valker, supra note 22, at
153-83 (discussing history of Commission).
61 Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994)).
62 See Federal Courts Study Comm., Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee
193-96 (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Study Committee Report].

63 Judicial Discipline and Removal Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 410, 104
Stat. 5122, 5124-25 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28 U.S.C.).
64 See Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1993) (discussing selection
process of 13-member commission).
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dition, the Administrative Office established the Office of Legislative
and Public Affairs in 1976, thereby creating a permanent staff-level
conduit between Congress and the judiciary. 65 A group of several
hundred federal judges formed the Federal Judges Association in
1981, a private organization dedicated to lobbying Congress on matters relating to judicial salaries, benefits, and administration 66 In
1991, the Judicial Conference created the Office of Judicial Impact
Assessment (OJIA) within the Administrative Office (at the suggestion of the Federal Courts Study Committee) to assess the impact of
proposed federal legislation on the courts for the benefit of members
of Congress considering such legislation. 67
c. Private Sector Initiatives. The private sector also initiated a
number of efforts to expand interbranch exchanges of ideas on matters of legislative reform. In 1978, the Brookings Institution began to
sponsor annual conferences attended by representatives of all three
branches of government for the explicit purpose of improving communications between the judiciary and Congress. 68 In 1985, Brookings
Institution Fellow Robert Katzmann and Judge Frank Coffin founded
the Governance Institute at the invitation of the Judicial Conference
Committee on the Judicial Branch to "examine past, present and future relations between Congress and the judiciary with the objective
of improving interbranch understanding. '69 Among the Institute's
projects 70 was one that brought several key judges, justices, and members of Congress together for an all-day conference on the judge-legislator relationship, culminating in the most significant collection of
articles on the subject to date;71 another resulted in an experimental
effort to better inform members of Congress and their staffs about
significant court decisions interpreting legislative enactments. 72
Aetna Corporation and Yale University likewise have brought judges,
legislators, and academics together in biannual conferences addressing
65 See Interview with David Sellers, Public Affairs Officer, Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts (Aug. 16, 1996).
66 See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process 16061 (1988) (discussing formation of Federal Judges Association).
67 See infra notes 315-41 and accompanying text.
68 See Cannon & Cikins, supra note 49, at 8-9 (discussing conception and implementation of first Brookings Conference).
69 Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A
Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 Geo. L.J. 653, 656 (1992).
70 See id. at 657 n.14 (listing Governance Institute projects).
71 See Judges and Legislators, supra note 5.
72 See Katzmann, supra note 69, at 665-67 (discussing development of system in which

complete opinions without comment were sent to congressional leaders).
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a range of issues of mutual interest, including court reform
73
legislation.
Given the numerous points of interaction between Congress and
the judiciary that operated for two centuries, one might regard the
recent trend toward expanding the interaction as merely a difference
in degree. It is, however, more than that. Despite the fact that the
judiciary has been involved in the lawmaking process ever since Congress created the federal courts in 1789, 74 the perception is otherwise.
The traditional relationship is described as being at "arms'-length," 75
and driven by an "old theory" that "to maintain the independence of
the judiciary," there "should not be... communication." 76 Many of
the recent calls for improved communication between the branches
proceed from the assumption that meaningful communications usually
7
have not occurred
Such a misperception is understandable. Although the branches
interacted and cooperated throughout the first two phases of their relationship, the subject went largely undiscussed in secondary literature
on the federal judiciary. A survey of nearly thirty treatises on the
United States courts and their role in the political process, treatises
written at or before the point at which phase three of the judgelegislator relationship began, reveals that the judiciary's extrajudicial
role in statutory reform rarely was addressed. 78
73 See George L. Priest & Judyth W. Pendell, Foreword, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1991, at 1, 2-3 (introducing articles presented at jointly sponsored conference).
74 See supra notes 2043 and accompanying text.
75 Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 20, at 33.
76 Federal Judiciary Administration Hearing, supra note 28, at 106 (statement of Subcommittee Chairman William J. Hughes).
77 See Coffin, supra note 51, at 22 ("The judiciary and Congress not only do not communicate with each other on their most basic concerns; they do not know how they may
properly do so."); Tacha, supra note 52, at 279 ("In this day of instant communication ...
one of the ultimate ironies is that members of the judiciary and Congress often fail to
communicate about issues of mutual concern.").
78 The list of treatises reviewed includes: Simeon E. Baldwin, The American Judiciary
(1905) (no discussion); Raoul Berger, Congress v. The Supreme Court (1969) (no discussion); Louis B. Boudin, Government by Judiciary (1932) (no discussion); Charles W. Bunn,
Jurisdiction and Practice of the Courts of the United States (1949) (no discussion);
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) (no discussion); Henry P.
Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System 1922-1947, at 354 (1963)
(brief discussion of 1948 statutory revision directing Chief Justice to submit annual report
to Congress); James E. Clayton, The Making of Justice: The Supreme Court in Action
(1964) (no discussion); Charles Grove Haines, The American Doctrine of Judicial
Supremacy (1932) (no discussion); Charles Grove Haines & Foster H. Sherwood, The Role
of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics, 1835-1864 (1957) (no discussion); Charles Grove Haines & Foster H. Sherwood, The Role of the Supreme Court in
American Government and Politics, 1789-1835 (1944) (no discussion); Henry M. Hart, Jr.
& Herbert Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 79-80 (1953) (brief discussion of letters from justices to presidents as advisory opinions); Charles Evans Hughes,
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One explanation for the omission may be that interbranch interaction was difficult to square with the prevailing paradigm that ours is
a government of separated powers, within which courts and Congress
pursue their respective missions in isolation. To the extent that courts
were not supposed to interact with and render assistance to Congress,
books defining and describing the role of the courts (as opposed to
books describing the lives of the judges or justices) logically excluded
the topic as ultra vires. 79 That may help to explain why, on those few
occasions when such works did discuss the judiciary's participation in
statutory reform, it was in the nature of an aside,80 or for the limited
The Supreme Court of the United States: Its Foundation, Methods and AchievementsAn Interpretation 30-31 (1928) (brief discussion of letter from Justice Johnson to President
Monroe concerning roadways legislation); James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American
Law: The Lawmakers 120 (1950) (brief discussion of justices' role in lobbying for 1925
judicial reform legislation); Robert H. Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government (1955) (no discussion); Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Supreme Court
from Taft to Warren (1958) (no discussion); Wallace Mendelson, The Supreme Court: Law
and Discretion (1967) (no discussion); W.H. Muller, Early History of the Federal Supreme
Court 26-28 (1922) (brief discussion of circuit court letter in opposition to 1791 Act);
Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (1964) (no discussion); Jack W. Peltason,
Federal Courts in the Political Process (1955) (no discussion); Fred Rodell, Nine Men: A
Political History of the Supreme Court from 1790 to 1955 (1955) (no discussion); John R.
Schmidhauser, The Supreme Court: Its Politics, Personalities, and Procedures (1960) (no
discussion); Glendon A. Schubert, The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of the
Supreme Court Justices, 1946-1963 (1965) (no discussion); Martin Shapiro, Law and Politics in the Supreme Court (1965) (no discussion); Carl Brent Swisher, The Supreme Court
in Modern Role (1958) (no discussion); Charles Warren, Congress, The Constitution, and
the Supreme Court (1925) (no discussion); Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United
States History (1922) [hereinafter Warren, Supreme Court in U.S. History] (brief discussion of Justice Johnson's letter to President Monroe concerning roadways legislation).
The lone exception, which includes repeated references to judge-legislator communications in the context of a book dedicated to the study of court reform legislation, is
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 21, passim. This work, however, goes no further than to
describe correspondence, without coming to terms with the role the courts played in the
legislative process.
79 For example, Alpheus Thomas Mason's book on the Supreme Court includes a 30page chapter on Chief Justice Taft that confines itself to a discussion of his and his Court's
jurisprudence. See Mason, supra note 78, at 39-69. On the other hand, Mason's biography
of Taft was not so constrained and devoted chapters to Taft's role as "judicial reformer,"
"lobbyist," and "presidential adviser." Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft:
Chief Justice 88-156 (1965). In other words, the activities of judges and the judiciary relating to statutory reform was known but was not included within the scope of the judiciary's
defined role.
8o See, e.g., Chandler, supra note 78, at 354 (brief allusion to legislation validating Judicial Conference's role in recommending legislative reform); Hurst, supra note 78, at 120
(stating that, in 1925, "[tjhe Court itself took the initiative" when three associate justices
drafted and when Chief Justice Taft "lent the weight of his office and prestige to advancing" legislation reducing mandatory appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court); I Warren,
Supreme Court in U.S. History, supra note 78, at 596-97 (reproducing Justice Johnson's
letter to President Monroe concerning roadways legislation).
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purpose of calling the propriety of such conduct into question in the
81
context of a brief discussion of advisory opinions.
In the third phase of the judge-legislator relationship, however,
that has changed as an increasing number of treatises on the United
States courts have begun to discuss the role of the judiciary in Congress, 82 and those that do not are sometimes criticized for the omission.83 As the judiciary's historic role in the legislative process is
being acknowledged more widely, and its current role is being expanded and actively encouraged, the time has come for a new paradigm of the judiciary's role in statutory reform. We are now at the
point where interbranch interaction, which has been an informal,
often overlooked, "exception" to the prevailing "rule" of strict separation and isolation, must swallow the rule and leave us with a new,
interactive model of government. What we see emerging is a paradigmatic shift in our understanding of the legislative process as it affects
the courts, from one in which separation principles are central and
cooperation and interaction are informal tempering influences, to one
in which cooperation and interaction are central and separation prin4
ciples temper the outer limits of permissible cooperation.8
81 See, e.g., Hart & Wechsler, supra note 78, at 79-80 (identifying letters written by
Justices Jay, Johnson, Hughes, and Taney to sitting presidents, and in one instance to member of Congress, on various legislative proposals as examples of arguably improper advisory opinions); Hughes, supra note 78, at 30-31 (discussing letter from Justice Johnson to
President Monroe concerning constitutionality of piece of legislation while noting that
"nothing of the sort could happen today"); see also Baldwin, supra note 78, at 32-33 (applauding Supreme Court's refusal to render advisory opinion on treaties with France at
President Washington's request and observing that "[n]o further request of this kind has
since been made by any of the political departments to a court of the United States").
82 See, e.g., Fish, supra note 21, passim; Fisher, supra note 66, at 153-61 (1988) (discussing political activities of judges); Richard Hodder-Williams, The Politics of the U.S.
Supreme Court 21, 49, 57-60 (1980) (describing attempts by Supreme Court justices to
influence Congress); Judges and Legislators, supra note 5, passim; David M. O'Brien,
Storm Center. The Supreme Court in American Politics 84-97 (1986) (discussing role of
justices in presidential politics and congressional lobbying); Smith, supra note 8, passim.
83 See Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 38, at 77 (criticizing "otherwise excellent" report of Council on the Role of Courts for "inexplicably neglect[ing] even to mention the congressional role").
84 Professor Jeffrey Stempel criticizes the tendency of many writers to identify new paradigns prematurely. See Jeffrey NV. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 Brook. L
Rev. 659, 702 (1993). In his excellent study of adjudicatory procedure and litigation reform, he concludes that two longstanding "open courts" and "litigation reform" paradigms
are crumbling, but that no new paradigms have yet emerged to take their place. Id. at 72737. My conclusions are different because the focus of my study is different. I have looked
at the nature of the relationship between judges and legislators in statutory reform and
rulemaking and found that the judiciary's role has transformed so fundamentally as to
warrant a new paradigm. Professor Stempel has looked at what I regard as the early ripple
effects of this transformation on litigation reform processes and has concluded that those
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The Judiciary'sRole in ProceduralRule Reform

Commentators have devoted considerably greater attention to
the judiciary's role in the rulemaking process than they have to its
niche in the legislative process.8 5 I see no point in restating these
analyses in detail or launching a futile attempt to improve upon them.
Rather, I will use the excellent work that has been done in the
rulemaking arena to highlight the parallels between the developing
roles of the judiciary in the rulemaking and legislative processes.
The history of the judiciary's role in rulemaking, like the history
of its role in the legislative process, falls into three phases covering
similar time periods. The conclusion is likewise similar: In rulemaking, as in statutory reform, the recent transformation of the judiciary's
role calls for a new model of the interbranch relationship, one in
which interaction replaces separation as the central and defining
feature.
1. Legislative Dominance: 1789-1934
Professor Stephen Burbank, in his groundbreaking history of the
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, detailed the chaotic course of procedural
law prior to the Act's passage. 86 In 1792, Congress authorized the
Supreme Court to promulgate procedural rules governing federal
court actions in equity and law, 87 a power Congress never withdrew in
equity actions and did not withdraw in actions at law until 1872.88 It
was, nevertheless, a power the Supreme Court rarely exercised.8 9
Although the federal judiciary exhibited little reluctance to shape
the progress of substantive law through common law decisionmaking, 90 it left the development of procedural law reform largely to Conprocesses remain in such a state of flux that it is not yet possible to predict what the new
paradigms of those processes will look like.
85 Among the many articles that evaluate the rulemaking process, and the judiciary's
role in that process, some of the very best include: Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015 (1982); Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to
Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-TransSubstantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2067 (1989); Marcus, supra note 4;
Mullenix, supra note 7; Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 905 (1976).
86 See Burbank, supra note 85, at 1035-98.
87 See Process Act of 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275,276; see also Burbank, supra note 85,
at 1039-40.
88 See Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197; see also Burbank,
supra note 85, at 1040 & n.105.
89 See Burbank, supra note 85, at 1039-40.

90 See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 17-18 (1842) (overruling state common
law with federal common law).
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gress. The best Congress could do was the Process Act of 179291 and
the Conformity Act of 1872.92 Under these acts, the federal courts
were authorized (in the case of the Process Act) or required (in the
case of actions at common law under the Conformity Act) to follow
procedural law of the state in which the court sat.93
Neither act succeeded in its goal of eliminating inconsistencies
between state and federal procedural law within any given state.94
Despite this track record of legislative failure, the ultimate transfer of
rulemaking power from Congress to the courts did not occur quickly
or easily.95 Roscoe Pound offered a four-fold explanation for Congress's longstanding, hard-dying dominance: First, legislative control
of procedure took hold "at a time when the legislative department did
not doubt its competence to every sort of task"; 96 second, the legal
profession had not assumed responsibility for molding procedural (as
opposed to substantive) law, relegating the task to the legislature; 97
third, American courts were reluctant to fill the void and craft procedural law, without an adequate model to follow;93 and fourth, legal
education (which to that point often meant apprenticeship) had overemphasized local procedure to the point of leading practitioners to
assume that procedure was "the main department of the law . ..
[which] must be left to legislation." 99
2. JudicialDominance: 1934-1973
The campaign to create a uniform body of procedural law governing litigation in the federal courts came at a time of growing support for uniform laws generally.'00 Roscoe Pound, a leader of the rule
reform movement, argued that a rational scheme of uniform proce91§ 2, 1Stat. at 276.
92 §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. at 197.
93 See Burbank, supra note 85, at 1037-40. For a discussion of the development of
procedural law in the context of admiralty and equity proceedings, as distinct from common law, see id. at 1037 n.90.
94 See id. at 1040-41 (describing lack of uniformity between federal and state court
procedural law following Act of 1872).
95 See id. at 1043-98 (outlining quest for uniform federal procedure in nineteenth century). Delays in the enactment of the Rules Enabling Act were attributable in no small
part to Senator Thomas Walsh, who worried that legislative delegation of rulemaking

power constituted an abdication of Congress's proper role. See Fsh, supra note 21, at 2223 (noting Walsh's additional concern that procedural reform would inconvenience smalltown lawyers).
96 Roscoe Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 600 (1926).
97

See id.

98 See id.
99 Id. at 601.

100 See Burbank, supra note 85, at 1043 (discussing quest for uniform civil procedure in
nineteenth century).
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dural law could best be achieved if the legislature transferred
rulemaking responsibility to the judiciary:o'
[T]he difficulty of procuring legislative action with reference to even
the most crying needs of judicial procedure is notorious. Legislatures today are so busy... that it is idle to expect [them] to take a
real interest in anything so remote from newspaper interest, so technical, and so recondite as legal procedure.... When a judicial council or a committee of a bar association comes to a court with a
project for rules of procedure, they will not have to call in experts to
tell the judges what the project is about .... When rules of proce-

dure are made by judges, they will grow out of experience, not the
ax-grinding desires of particular lawmakers. 1' 2

The procedural law reform campaign culminated in passage of
the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,103 which was followed by forty years
of judicial rulemaking uninterrupted by congressional interference. 104
The Act facilitated judicial rulemaking dominance by giving the
Supreme Court the power to promulgate procedural rules,105 by making such rules effective six months after promulgation absent congressional intercession, 0 6 and by providing that Court-promulgated rules
would supersede prior, inconsistent legislation. 0 7
In 1956, the Supreme Court inexplicably discharged the Rules
Advisory Committee that the Court had established and kept in place
since 1935.108 Two years thereafter, Congress (with the Supreme

Court's approval) directed the Judicial Conference to assume the role
of the defunct Rules Advisory Committee and reserved to the Court
the power to adopt, modify, or reject Conference-generated rules.10 9
The Judicial Conference, in turn, created a rules advisory committee
101 Dean Pound's 1906 address to the American Bar Association (ABA), "The Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice," prompted the ABA to constitute a committee (including Pound) to investigate the problems Pound identified. Id. at
1045-46. Three years later, the committee issued a report which included a section on
procedure that condemned "legislative tinkering" and hailed Supreme Court rulemaking.
Id. at 1046.
102 Pound, supra note 96, at 602.
103 Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994)).
104 See Burbank, supra note 85, at 1018 (reporting that long-enduring pattern of congressional acquiescence in adoption of federal rules was broken in response to proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1973 and has not been reestablished).
105 See id. at 1024.
106 See Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2071 (1994)).
107 See id.
108 See Order Discharging the Advisory Committee, 352 U.S. 803 (1956); see also 4
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1006 (1987).
109 See Act of July 11, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513,72 Stat. 356 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331
(1994)); see also 4 Wright & Miller, supra note 108, § 1007.
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that responds to rule reform proposals in much the same way as other
Conference committees respond to legislative reform proposals.110
Neither the original Act nor its subsequent amendments prohibited congressional tinkering with procedural rules. That such tinkering did not occur has been variously attributed to judicial respect for
the substance-procedure dichotomy,"' congressional deference to the
rulemaking expertise of the judiciary, 1 2 and congressional
disinterest.1 ' 3
3. Heightened Interaction: 1973-Present
In 1973, Chief Justice Warren Burger transmitted the proposed
Rules of Evidence to Congress. Congress responded by suspending
the proposed rules114 and enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence two
years later," 5 thus ending the era of uncontested judicial dominion
over procedural rulemaking.
The Rules of Evidence imbroglio created the first real opportunity for the two branches to explore where the judiciary's power to
make "procedural" rules ended, and where Congress's exclusive
power to make "substantive" law began.1 6 The exploration did not
occur in a vacuum. To the contrary, the Senate Judiciary Committee
Report accompanying the Rules of Evidence bill described a process
110 See Annual Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. 6-7
(1958). For a description of the Rules Committee Process, see Carrington, supra note 85,
at 2119-24.
111 See Burbank, supra note 85, at 1131-37 (summarizing arguments of other scholars to
effect that rulemakers have recently abandoned their longstanding respect for limitations
of Rules Enabling Act).
112 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 85, at 927-30 (noting how Congress had delegated its
rulemaking power almost entirely to courts since 1930s, leaving Congress in role of
monitor).
113 See Jack K. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 673, 675 (1975) (noting traditional congressional indifference to rulemaking proposals); Mullenix, supra note 7, at 799 (noting widespread ennui
regarding judicial rulemaking process).
114 See Act to Promote the Separation of Powers by Suspending Rules of Evidence,
Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973) (repealed 1988) [hereinafter Separation of Powers Act].
115 See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
116 Whether rules of evidence, particularly rules governing admissibility, modified a
"substantive right" and were thus outside the purview of the judiciary's rulemaking authority had been a question debated by judges and scholars alike. See Burbank, supra note 85,
at 1137-43 (contending that principal source of difficulty has been failure to mark distinction between rules regulating taking and obtaining evidence (procedural) and rules regulating admissibility of evidence (substantive)). That the substance-procedure distinction
was at the forefront of Congress's mind is reflected in the act suspending the proposed
rules. Congress deferred the effective date of the rules with explicit reference to Justice
Douglas's dissent from the Court's decision to approve the proposed rules; Douglas had
objected on the grounds that the rules were substantive in nature. Separation of Powers
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
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awash in a sea of lobbyists. 117 Apart from problems that particular
interest groups had with specific provisions of the proposed rules, a
primary concern, as described by Professor Paul Carrington, was "that
the Evidence rules as promulgated by the Court were too substantive,
that is too laden with political consequences, to be suitable for enactment by an unelected court." 1 8
The Rules of Evidence episode highlighted the relevance of procedural law to the vindication of substantive rights in a way that attracted and held the attention of individuals and organizations that
litigate in the federal courts. 1 9 Congress responded to this newfound
public interest with twenty-four public laws between 1973 and 1984
20
modifying or suspending procedural rules.
Legislators with committee jurisdiction over federal court procedure were not sanguine about Congress routinely substituting its political judgments for the expert assessments of the Judicial
Conference.' 2 ' In an attempt to revitalize the judiciary's rulemaking
role, Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act in 1988 to encourage
The Report stated that:
From the outset, it was clear that the content of the proposed privilege
provisions was extremely controversial. Critics attacked, and proponents defended, the secrets of state and official information privileges ....In addition,
the husband-wife privilege drew fire ....The partial doctor-patient privilege
seemed to satisfy no one, either doctors or patients; and even the attorneyclient privilege as drafted came in for its share of criticism because of its failure
to define representative of the client, a critical issue for corporations and organizations. Much controversy also attended the failure to include a newsman's
privilege.
S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7053.
118 Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real
Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 300 (1994); see also S. Rep. No. 1277, at 6, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7053 (explaining Senate Judiciary Committee's rejection of Courtproposed evidence rules with reference to commentators who "questioned the wisdom of
promulgating rules of privilege under the Rules Enabling Act, on the ground that in their
view, the codification of the law of privilege should be left to the regular legislative
process").
119 See Russell R. Wheeler, Broadening Participation in the Courts Through RuleMaking and Administration, 62 Judicature 280, 285 (1979) ("Recognition of the potential
effect of rules has spurred interest by other groups previously unaware of, or uninterested
in, the rule-making process.").
120 See H.R. Rep. No. 422,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 n.20 (1985) (citing public laws modifying procedural rules).
121 The House Judiciary Committee's discomfort with legislative intervention into the
procedural rulemaking arena is made plain in the Committee Report accompanying the
1988 Rules Enabling Act amendments, in which the Committee declared that the Rules
Enabling Act process "worked well for many years ....New rules and amendments to
existing rules routinely took effect without any congressional intervention. In recent years,
however, Congress has taken a greater interest in new rules and amendments promulgated
under the Rules Enabling Acts." H.R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5987-88. Hence, the need for reform.
117
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greater public participation in the Judicial Conference's rulemaking
proceedings and thereby decrease the public's need for recourse to
Congress. 122 The accompanying legislative history also sought to clarify the point at which the judiciary's authority to regulate "procedure"
ended, and Congress's exclusive authority to regulate "substance" began, inan effort to avoid future misunderstandings and the need for
frequent congressional intervention in the rulemaking process. 123
The attempt failed.124 In 1990, Congress passed the Civil Justice
122 Chief Judge Jack B. Weinstein wrote the House Judiciary Committee that the bill's
"requirement for open discussions" would be a "great improvement" because it "should
reduce the necessity of congressional intervention through legislation." Rules Enabling
Act Hearings, supra note 57, at 196 (letter from Chief Judge Jack B. Weinstein to Subcommittee Chairman Robert W. Kastenmeier). The House Judiciary Committee appears to
have agreed. "Clearly, federal court rules touch important values," the Committee report
declared. H.R.Rep. No. 422, at 16. "Interest groups concerned with those values have not
had enough input into the current system, and as a consequence they have sought to influence the Congress to reject proposed rules." Id.; see also 11R.Rep. No. 889, at 29-30,
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5989-91 (accompanying bill that ultimately adopted and
incorporated previous report by reference). The Committee concluded that "[olpenness
coupled with notice will encourage participation by a broad segment of the community and
avoid potential misunderstandings and will ultimately assist the Congressional review process." .R.Rep. No. 422, at 26. On this point the Committee report inserted a footnote
reference to a letter from Alan B. Morrison, Director of the Public Citizen Litigation
Group, to Judge Edward T. Gignoux, which stated that "the reason why it was necessary
for Congress to step in and delay the effect of Rule 4 had much less to do with the substance of the new Rule, than with the perception that the process had not fairly considered
the views of all interested persons." Rules Enabling Act Hearings, supra note 57, at 183
(letter from Alan B. Morrison, Director of the Public Citizen Litigation Group, to Judge
Edward T. Gignoux (Aug. 20, 1982)). In other words, by opening the rulemaking process
up to interested groups, Congress hoped to reduce the need for legislative interference.
123 See H.R. Rep. No. 422, at 20-22. For a discussion of the House Judiciary Committee
Report's exegesis on the substance-procedure distinction, see Stephen B. Burbank, Hold
the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules
Enabling Act, 1989 Duke L.J. 1012, 1030-36.
124 See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 799-801. Professor Mullenix and I differ in our perceptions of the role played by the 1988 Rules Enabling Act amendments. In her 1991 article,
Professor Mullenix predicted that "[ihe professional torpor in the civil rulemaking process
is now about to change," thanks to the 1988 amendments, id. at 799; that by opening the
rulemaking process to lobbyists, the amendments "will politicize the rulemaking process as
never before," id. at 801, to the inevitable end of "plac[ing] procedural reform in Congress's hands," id. at 802.
In my mind, she was predicting the past and lavishing too much credit or blame on the
1988 amendments. First, the Judicial Conference had opened its rulemaking process up to
the public years previously, so that the 1988 amendments did little more than codify existing practice. See H.R Rep. No. 889, at 27, reprinted in 19S8 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5937-88.
Second, she undercuts her hypothesis by illustrating the hazards of congressional rule revision with a string of examples predating the 1988 amendments, demonstrating that the
trend toward politicization of the rulemaking process was in full swing by the time that the
amendments were adopted. See Mullenix, supra note 7, at 844-51. The 198S amendments
may have amounted to little more than a futile attempt to stop the unstoppable trend
toward greater congressional involvement in rulemaking that had begun 15 years earlier.
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Reform Act of 1990,125 which regulated the means by which district
courts developed procedures for managing their civil litigation dockets, and did so over the Judicial Conference's objection that the issue
126
was better left to judicial rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act.
In 1993, members of Congress launched an effort to suspend proposed
amendments to Civil Procedure Rule 26, an effort that failed not because Congress favored the rule or was reluctant to second-guess the
judiciary but because Congress could not reach agreement on the text
of a substitute proposal before time ran out and the rule became effective. 127 In 1994, Congress amended the Federal Rules of Evidence by
adding Rules 413 through 415.128 And in 1995, legislation explicitly
amending Rule 11, and implicitly amending Civil Rules 68 and 23, became law following a congressional override of President Clinton's
veto.'

29

It may have been naive for Congress to hope that simply giving
interest groups greater access to Judicial Conference rulemaking proceedings would diminish the desire of those groups to seek legislative
redress. When Congress delegated primary rulemaking responsibility
to the Supreme Court in 1934, it did so on the premise that rules of
procedure do not implicate substantive fights to such an extent as to
require legislative policymakers to write them. Since 1973, however,
that premise has ceased to be a given. As the Reporter to the Judicial
Conference's Advisory Committee on Civil Rules explained in a
memo to the Committee:
"Those few who observe judicial rulemaking are far more likely
today to see social and economic consequences in what the Committee does than were earlier generations of observers. The subAt a minimum, however, we agree that the amendments did nothing to reduce congressional intercession in the rulemaking process.
125 Pub. L. No. 101-650,.104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471482 (1994)),
126 See The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act of
1990: Hearings on S. 2027 and S. 2648 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 221 (1990) [hereinafter Civil Justice Reform Act Hearings] (statement of
Chief Judge Aubrey E.Robinson, Jr.).
127 See Randall Samborn, Rules for Discovery Uncertain, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 20, 1993, at 1
(reporting that legislation to override disclosure rules was approved in House but not in
Senate in light of lingering concerns over certain provisions of legislation as drafted).
128 See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 320935(a), 108 Stat. 2135. Even more remarkable is that Congress suspended the effective date of the rules it enacted for 150 days in order to permit Judicial Conference review,
thereby effectively turning the Rules Enabling Act (which calls for a seven-month suspension of Supreme Court-approved rules, pending congressional review) on its head. See 23
Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5411
(Supp. 1996).
129

See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.

737 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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stance-procedure line was never clear, and was never constant in its
application to different contexts; but it also may be that its meaning
has changed over the years, with more matters being perceived to
be substantive than may once have been true."' ' 0
If procedural rules are thought to modify substantive rights, and
substantive rights are thought to be within the exclusive province of
Congress to modify, no amount of access to the judicial rulemaking
process is going to convince an interested party or her elected representative that Congress should not intercede. 131 Whereas in statutory
reform it is the judiciary's involvement that has increased, in rule reform it is Congress that has become a more active player. In both
cases, however, the effect is the same: a transformation of the interbranch relationship from one typified by separation and delegation to
one of interaction and occasionally, as discussed in Part III,
confrontation.
II
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND ETHICAL CONSTRAINTS
ON JUDGE-LEGISLATOR INTERACTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF STATUTES AND RuLEs

As separation and delegation have given way to interaction and
shared responsibility as the defining features of the judge-legislator
relationship in statutory reform and rulemaking, some judges, legislators, and academicians have become increasingly concerned with the
scope and limits of the judiciary's new lawmaking role. They have
worried aloud that the Constitution, various federal statutes, and the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges bar a range of extrajudicial
lawmaking activity within the ambit of the interactive paradigm. As I
hope to show, these concerns are largely unfounded but are well
worth addressing because uncertainty surrounding their validity has
impeded the orderly growth of interbranch interaction in the new
paradigm.

130 Mullenix, supra note 7, at 835-36 (quoting Reporter, Memorandum to Civil Rules
Committee re Questions About the Rulemaking Process (Oct. 18, 1989)).
131 See, e.g., Rules Enabling Act Hearings, supra note 57, at 149 (statement of Professor

Burt Neuborne) ("[I]f in fact there is really a genuine and perhaps insoluble uncertainty as
to what constitutes a substantive rule and what constitutes a procedural rule, the only practical way out may be for Congress to enact the Federal rules as though they were a
statute.").
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The Legislative Process

Constitutional Constraints

1.

The separation of powers is often identified as an impediment to
interbranch cooperation in legislative reform. 132 An illustration of the
separation-of-powers concern in action occurred in 1991, when the Judicial Conference followed the lead of its Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation and recommended that Congress consider legislation
to address the onslaught of asbestos lawsuits. 133 The recommendation
was consciously nonspecific. As Judge Thomas M. Reavley, Committee Chairman, explained: "[t]he committee finally decided to limit
[its] recommendations to matters of principle and general procedures
without taking stands on policy or substantive law."'1 34 Judge Reavley
elaborated to The New York Times that the Committee had "a file of
draft legislation, but we were advised that we were risking an impro-

priety by recommending specific legislation."'1 35 "The issue came
down to one of separation of powers," The Times reported Reavley as
legislation that, if
saying, "and whether judges ought to recommend1 36
adopted, they would inevitably have to interpret."'
The judiciary's willingness to recommend legislative reform but
not to say what it has in mind is a clear manifestation of the continued
uncertainty that surrounds the constitutional limitations upon
legislative-judicial interaction. Such uncertainty is unwarranted and
unnecessary. Bluntly put, the Constitution poses no impediment to
the heightened legislative-judicial cooperation contemplated by a
new, more interactive paradigm.
As central as the separation of powers may be to the structure of
our government, it is not an explicit part of the Constitution. Rather,
it is implied in the organization and language of the first three articles,
132

As J. Clark Kelso argues:
Judicial lobbying is risky business. It tends to blur the distinction between
the legislative and executive branches, which are constitutionally involved in
enacting and enforcing positive law, and the judicial branch, which is constitutionally involved only in interpreting, applying, and reviewing positive law.
This blurring of constitutional functions can undermine separation of powers

Kelso, supra note 6, at 862; see also Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 17, at 1087 &
nn.124-25 (noting separation-of-powers concerns of judges and commentators over direct
contact between judges and legislators).
133 See Judicial Conference Seeks Reform of Asbestos Litigation, The Third Branch
(Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts), Apr. 1991, at 1, 1.
134 Judge Thomas M. Reavley: Studying the Asbestos Litigation Explosion, The Third
Branch (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts), Apr. 1991, at 10, 11.
135 Stephen Labaton, Judges Struggle to Control a Caseload Crisis, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10,
1991, at E4.
136 Id.
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which vest all legislative powers in Congress, 137 the executive power in
the President, 138 and the judicial power in the courts. 139 The absence
of a separation-of-powers clause is by no means accidental; James
Madison made it quite clear that such language was omitted to protect
against unhealthy isolation of the branches. 140
When judges propose, draft, testify on, and lobby for or against
legislative reform, they do not usurp a legislative power that the Constitution vests in Congress alone. To the contrary, they exercise no
"power" at all. Even so, one could still argue that they exceed the
boundaries of "judicial" power, to which Article III courts are confined. Superficially, at least, a judge who testifies as to the meaning of
proposed legislation might seem to be offering an advisory opinion in
contravention of Article MI's "cases" or "controversies" limitation.
Upon closer examination, however, such an argument is undercut by
the constitutional text, history, and common sense.
The Constitution vests judicial power not in the judges themselves, but in the "supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."' 41 Had the
intent been to confer Article II power upon "Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts," the document could have used that
phrase, as it does in the adjacent good behavior clause. 142 The judicial
power and its limits thus apply to the courts as institutions and not to
the judges as individuals. It is only when judges are sitting qua
"court," exercising Article Ill powers, that they are limited to deciding cases or controversies. Extrajudicial law reform activities underSee U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
138 See id. art. II, § 1.
139 See id. art. IH, § 1.
137

140 In The FederalistNo. 47, Madison reviewed state constitutions and concluded that in
practice "there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power have
been kept absolutely separate and distinct," despite the text of those Constitutions calling

for "the emphatical and, in some instances, the unqualified" separation of powers. The
Federalist No. 47, at 304 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The states' devia-

tion from their constitutional text was, in Madison's view, justified because separation-ofpowers principles do not "require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments
should be wholly unconnected with each other." Id. No. 48, at 308 (James Madison). To

the contrary, "unless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each
a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained." Id.
For a general discussion of how the powers of the first and third branches of the federal
government are separate yet blended, see Charles Gardner Geyh, Highlighting a Low
Point on a High Court: Some Thoughts on the Removal of Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Justice Rolf Larsen and the Limits of Judicial Self-Regulation, 68 Temp. L Rev. 1041,
1051-54 (1995).
141 U.S. Const. art. m, § 1.
142 Id.
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taken by judges acting as administrators or individuals are simply
unaffected by the limits Article III places on courts.
Early Justices on the Supreme Court shared this common sense
reading of Article III. Emily Field Van Tassel and Maeva Marcus
found that in the last decade of the eighteenth century, judges distinguished between advice offered in their institutionalcapacities-which
they regarded as improper advisory opinions-and advice or other
assistance rendered in their individual capacities-which they considered to present no constitutional difficulties. 143 Indeed, individual
Justices actively lobbied legislators on a host of issues in the first decade of the federal judiciary's existence. 144
In other words, Article III forecloses courts from issuing opinions
with the force and effect of law on the wisdom or legality of legislation
outside the context of live cases or controversies. It has no bearing
upon judges acting as individuals or representatives of the Judicial
Conference who render advice and assistance to Congress without exercising Article III powers. 145
2. Statutory Constraints
In addition to the Constitution, there are at least three federal
statutes that arguably circumscribe the judiciary's extrajudicial role in
143 See Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 20, at 41-42. For example, in response to a
formal, written request from President Washington to all members of the Supreme Court
soliciting their views on the interpretation of treaties and other matters, the Justices declined to answer on separation-of-powers grounds. See Letter from John Jay, James
Wilson, John Blair, James Iredell, and William Paterson to George Washington (Aug. 8,
1793), on file in National Archives Record Group No. 59, cited in Marcus & Van Tassel,
supra note 20, at 42 n.34. As Marcus and Van Tassel noted:
This type of request must be distinguished from simply asking advice from the
justices, on a personal basis, on a great variety of matters of state. President
Washington, for example, availed himself of the knowledge and good judgment
of Chief Justice John Jay on many occasions. That this occasion was different
in kind was obvious to all involved.
Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 20, at 41 n.30.
144 See Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 20, at 36-42; Tacha, supra note 52, at 286-89.
145 One might well wonder how my position squares with that of judicial nominees who,
in Senate confirmation hearings, have invoked the separation of powers in support of their
refusal to answer questions as to how they would rule in particular cases. Senators pose
such questions, in part, with the intent of manipulating outcomes of future cases by making
the nominee's prospective ruling on a given issue relevant to her confirmation. Judicial
nominees legitimately refuse to answer such questions on separation-of-powers grounds
because the Senate could usurp an essential judicial function if it was able to limit the pool
of judges to those who will say that the law is what the Senate thinks it is. Judicial participation in the legislative process does not pose a comparable problem because the judge's
point of view is solicited not for the purpose of intruding on the judiciary's province but to
aid in the development of sensible legislation.
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statutory reform.146 Upon closer scrutiny, however, it becomes clear
that they do no such thing.
a. The Organic Statute of the Judicial Conference. The statute
creating the Judicial Conference provides that "[t]he Chief Justice
shall submit to Congress an annual report of the proceedings of the
Judicial Conference and its recommendations for legislation."1 47 In
March 1984, Senators East, Symms, and Denton sent a letter to the
Comptroller General arguing that in light of this statute, the Chief
Justice alone was authorized to make legislative recommendations to
Congress. 14 8 The Comptroller General disagreed: "Based on a review of the provisions of the entire statute and its legislative history,
we find nothing to support such a rigid interpretation."1 49 Rather, the
Comptroller read the statute to say only that the Chief Justice must
report to Congress annually with any Conference recommendations
for legislation-not that the Chief is foreclosed from assigning other
members of the Conference to communicate with Congress at other
times or that other members of the judiciary are precluded from contacting Congress on their own.1 50
b. The Statutory Prohibition on Lobbying with Appropriated
Moneys. A more serious potential statutory impediment to heightened judge-legislator interaction is legislation intended to limit the authority of government employees to lobby Congress with
appropriated funds:
No part of the money appropriated by any enactment of Congress shall... be used directly or indirectly to pay for any personal
service, advertisement, telegram, telephone, letter, printed or written matter, or other device, intended or designed to influence in any
manner a Member of Congress, to favor or oppose ... any legisla-

tion... but this shall not prevent officers or employees of the
United States... from communicating to Members of Congress on
the request of any Member or to Congress, through the proper official channels, requests for legislation or appropriations which they
deem necessary for the efficient conduct of the public business. 1l5

See infra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 331; see supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
148 See Letter on Behalf of Comptroller General of the United States to Senator
Jeremiah Denton 8 (Sept. 26, 1984) [hereinafter Comptroller Letter] (on file with author)
(referencing and responding to letter from Senators East, Symms, and Denton).
146

147

149
150
151

Id.

See id. at 8-10.
18 U.S.C. § 1913 (1994).
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The Judicial Conference takes this statute quite seriously-perhaps too seriously-and professes never to speak to Congress (outside
of its annual report) unless requested to do so by a member. As Judge
Elmo Hunter, speaking on behalf of the Judicial Conference, explained to Senator DeConcini: "We do not ask you or tell you or
advise you how to pass on bills unless you invite our comments. We
are very careful. My committee simply will not respond concerning
legislation unless the invitation originates with one or the other of the
bodies of the Congress.' ' 152
Hinging the Judicial Conference's participation in the legislative
process upon a real or imagined "invitation" from Congress is utterly
unnecessary. The statute includes an explicit exception permitting appropriated moneys to be used for communications made "through the
proper or official channels.' 53
More nettlesome, perhaps, is whether the statute forbids judges
who do not represent the Judicial Conference from using appropriated
monies to communicate with Congress in the absence of an invitation
to do so. The senators who queried the Comptroller General as to
whether judge-legislator communications were inconsistent with the
Judicial Conference's enabling statute also inquired as to whether
such communications ran afoul of the antilobbying statute if federal
funds were utilized. 154
The Comptroller General answered with an unequivocal no, on
the grounds that such communications fall within the "official channels" exception because individual judges have no direct superior and
are "arguably" their own "agency spokespersons.' 1 55 The only restriction the statute imposes upon a judge's communications with Congress, then, is that if she uses the resources of her office to make such
communications, she must limit herself to issues relating to "the effi152 Judicial Conference and Councils in the Sunshine Act, S. 2045: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980). When the judiciary's interest in legislative reform Is keen,
"invitation" receives a liberal construction. For example, in response to Senator DeConcini's inquiry as to why the Judicial Conference registered its opposition to judicial discipline legislation despite the fact that the Senate "did not ask [it] to do that," Judge Hunter
explained that at the most recent of the annual Brookings Institution Conferences, he
"thought that [he] heard an invitation to advise the Congress at any time of any pressing
need or problem of the judiciary." Id. at 20. In the absence of a standing invitation to
communicate on any and all matters of interest to the judiciary, judicial branch personnel
will privately solicit written "invitations" from legislators seeking the judiciary's views on
particular matters. See Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 38, at 84.
153 18 U.S.C. § 1913.
154 See Comptroller Letter, supra note 148, at 1.
155

Id. at 1, 3-4.
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cient conduct of the public business,
have an impact on the

judiciary."'' 5 7

'156

1197

meaning issues that "would

Given that judges' unique exper-

tise is limited to matters relevant to the judiciary and that the goal of
the new interactive paradigm is to facilitate congressional access to
this unique expertise,158 the constraints the statute imposes on the use
of public funds for communications irrelevant to the judiciary are of
no particular consequence.
c. AppropriationsRestrictions. Annual appropriations acts, including those applicable to the judiciary, often proscribe the use of

appropriated funds for "publicity or propaganda purposes."1 59

Although one could conceivably interpret this clause so broadly as to
bar all legislative lobbying, the Comptroller General has declined to
do so:
In our view, Congress did not intend, by enactment of [such]
measures ... to prohibit government officials, including Federal

judges, from expressing their views on pending legislation. Rather,
the ... prohibition applies primarily to expenditures for grass roots

lobbying campaigns involving appeals addressed to members of the
public suggesting that they contact their elected representatives to
indicate support of or opposition to pending legislation, or to urge
their representatives to vote in a particular manner. 16°
In other words, the appropriations restriction proscribes the use of
appropriated funds for "grass roots lobbying" but imposes no meaningful limits on interbranch communication.
3. Ethical Constraints
The cacophony of commentary on the ethical limits of a federal
judge's participation in the legislative process has vacillated between
bold, contradictory edicts that judges are duty bound to avoid the legislature or to assist it actively, on the one hand, and timid, unhelpful
suggestions that "it all depends," on the other. 161 Despite this divergence of views, it seems to me that the ethical limits of a judge's participation in legislative reform, as spelled out in the Code of Conduct
156 18 U.S.C. § 1913.

157 Comptroller Letter, supra note 148, at 4.
158 See supra notes 49-84 and accompanying text.
159 See, e.g., Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related

Agency Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 103-317, § 601, 108 Stat. 1773, 1773 (1994); see
also Comptroller Letter, supra note 148, at 4 (noting that propaganda restrictions have
been included in "various appropriation acts" since 1950s).
160
161

Comptroller Letter, supra note 148, at 5.
See infra notes 167, 169, 172-74, 193-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of

relevant commentary.
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for United States Judges, 162 are relatively clear, and the real disagreement concerns the prudential or practical-not ethical-limits of a
judge's participation in legislative reform.
The state of the "law" setting the ethical limits of a federal
judge's participation in the legislative process is governed by the Judicial Conference's Code of Conduct for United States Judges. 163 Canon 2(A) articulates the general-to the point of being unhelpfulproposition that "[a] judge should... act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."'164 Canon 3(A)(6) provides that "[a] judge should avoid public comment on the merits of a pending or impending action," a
provision which may apply in some instances. 65 Canon 4, in turn, offers more specific guidance:
A judge ... may engage in the following law-related activities,

if in doing so the judge does not cast reasonable doubt on the capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before the judge:
B. A judge may appear at a public hearing before, or otherwise consult with, an executive or legislative body or official on matters concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of
justice to the extent that it would generally be perceived that a
judge's judicial experience provides special expertise in the area. A
judge acting pro se may also appear before or consult with such
officials or bodies in a matter involving the judge or the judge's
66
interest.'

Few quarrel with the view that the Code permits judges to participate freely in the development of legislation relating to the legal system and the administration of justice, insofar as such legislation
directly affects the judiciary and its operations.1 67 Judges' "special ex162 See 2 Guide to Judicial Policies & Procedure ch. 1, Canon 4(B) (Conference Comm.
on Codes of Conduct, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts 1994).

163 See id.
164 2 id. Canon 2(A).

2 id. Canon 3(A)(6).
2 id. Canon 4(A)-(B).
See Advisory Comm. on Judicial Activities, Judicial Conference of U.S., Advisory
Op. 50 (1977), in 2 Guide to Judicial Policies & Procedure, supra note 162, at IV-119 [hereinafter Advisory Op.50] (suggesting restrictions on judicial appearances before legislative
bodies on matters concerning law but not administration of justice); E. Wayne Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct 75-76 (1973) (opining that judges "should be
allowed to consult" with legislative bodies on matters of judicial administration); Kelso,
supra note 6, at 863 ("Judges are directly affected by legislation regarding the administra165
166
167

tion of justice, and it is imperative that judges have the opportunity to comment upon such
legislation."); Robert B. McKay, The Judiciary and Nonjudicial Activities, 35 Law & Contemp. Probs. 9,21 (1970) ("No one is better qualified to speak on law reform and questions

of improvement in judicial administration than judges.... [N]o barrier should be raised
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pertise" on these issues is indisputable, and the circumstances are rare
in which their prior testimony on such matters will call their impartiality into question in a later case. 16
The consensus breaks down when it comes to whether a judge
may participate in the development of "the law," when the law in
question does not affect the judiciary or its operations directly. 169
Suppose, for example, that a congressional committee solicited the
testimony of a federal judge on a bill to legalize marijuana in light of
the judge's extensive experience on the bench with drug possession
and distribution cases. 170 If the judge supports the legislation, could
her testimony "cast doubt" on her capacity to decide future marijuana
cases impartially, within the meaning of Canon 4? Is her expertise
"special" enough to permit her to testify as a judge, rather than as a
private citizen?
The Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct renders advisory interpretations of the Code in response to inquiries from
federal judges. 171 The Committee has opined that Canon 4(B) should
be construed narrowly, and that a judge should appear before a legisagainst judicial participation in such activities beyond assurance that the obligations of
judicial office are met."); Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, What Role Should Judges Play in the
ABA?: The Appellate Judges Conference Position, Judges' J., Spring 1992, at 9. 13 (reporting on conclusions of ABA Commission on Judicial Participation in American Bar
Association and noting that Commission was unconcerned about extent to which judges
were associated with ABA positions on judicial administration legislation, because -it does
not matter that the public may attribute them to judicial members of the ABA"); William
G. Ross, Extrajudicial Speech: Charting the Boundaries of Propriety, 2 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 589, 623-24 (1989) (noting that it is generally appropriate for judges to comment on
court administration or legislation that affects their court); see also Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist, 1994 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 5-9 (Dec. 30, 1994) (declaring it "obviously appropriate" for judiciary to communicate with Congress on such issues
as wages, hours, and working conditions within judiciary;, procedural matters affecting
courts; impact of legislation on courts; and expansion of federal jurisdiction).
168 As with all rules, there are exceptions. For example, legislation expanding or contracting diversity jurisdiction has an obvious impact on the federal courts and their operation, and Canon 4 poses no bar to a judge testifying to that impact. See infra note 179 and
accompanying text. At the same time, one can concoct a scenario in which a judge's crusade to abolish diversity jurisdiction leads her to neglect her judicial duties and to testify
before Congress that she will reject all diversity claims filed in her court. Canon 4 authorizes a judge to engage in law-related activities "subject to the proper performance of judicial duties," and only "if in doing so the judge does not cast reasonable doubt on the
capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before the judge." Such conditions
are obviously violated by the judge in this hypothetical. See 2 Guide to Judicial Policies &
Procedure, supra note 162, Canon 4, at 1-22.
169 See Kelso, supra note 6, at 863 (expressing concern over judges' active involvement
in development of legislation that does not regulate judiciary); Ross, supra note 167, at

614-15 (same).

170 I am assuming that the focus of the judge's testimony is not on the impact of drug
legalization on docket congestion.
171 See 2 Guide to Judicial Policies & Procedure, supra note 162, at I-iii.
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lative body concerning "the law" only if the issue "merit[s] the attention and comment of a judge as a judge, and not merely as an
individual."'172 This opinion was rendered prior to the 1992 amendments to Canon 4, which added language permitting a judge to appear
pro se on matters of personal interest without regard to whether the
judge possesses special expertise. 173 In the case of our hypothetical
judge asked to testify on a bill to legalize marijuana possession, then,
she could appear pro se, regardless of whether she possessed expertise
"special" enough to permit her to testify in an official capacity. As
Chief Justice Rehnquist observed in his 1994 Year-End Report:
[W]hat is an appropriate sentence for a particular offense, and similar matters, are questions upon which a judge's view should carry no
more weight than the view of any other citizen. In such cases I do
not believe that the Judicial Conference... should take an official
position.... There is certainly no formal inhibition on [individual]
judges publicly stating their own personal opinions about matters of
policy within the domain of Congress, but the fact that their position
as a judge may give added weight to their statements should counsel
174
caution in doing so.

Chief Justice Rehnquist's lingering concern about the weight that
Congress or the public may give a judge's statements raises the question of whether a judge who testifies on a proposed law violates Canon 4's proscription of quasi-judicial activities that "cast reasonable
doubt on the capacity to decide impartially any issue" relating to that
law. 175 At least one decision rendered by a chief judge under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980176 suggests that, in the case of
172 Advisory Op. 50, supra note 167, at IV-122.

The earlier version of Canon 4(B) provided in its entirety that
"[a judge] may appear at a public hearing before an executive or legislative
body or official on matters concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, and a judge may otherwise consult with an executive or
legislative body or official, but only on matters concerning the administration
of justice."
Id. at IV-119 (quoting earlier version of Canon 4(B)).
174 Rehnquist, supra note 167, at 8. I confess to being puzzled by Chief Justice
Rehnquist's observation that a federal judge is in no better position than the average citizen to comment on the appropriate sentence for a particular offense. The notion that a
judge acquires no special expertise by passing sentence on hundreds of offenders, and is
therefore no better situated than a garage mechanic to assess whether a particular punishment fits a particular crime, strikes me as questionable. Judge Schwarzer makes the better
argument that judges are well positioned to opine as experts on sentencing issues. See
infra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
175 2 Guide to Judicial Policies & Procedure, supra note 162, Canon 4, at 1-22.
176 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1994). As previously noted, the primary vehicle for interpretation
of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges is through advisory interpretations rendered by the Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct. See supra text accompanying note 171. The Code is also used, however, to establish standards of conduct In
173
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the judge who testifies in support of legislation to legalize marijuana,
the answer is no. In a synopsis of disciplinary actions processed under
that Act, Professor Richard Marcus reported on a complaint filed by a
public interest group against a district judge for giving "a public
speech... calling for the legalization of drug use."'" According to
Marcus, the group argued "that the judge's speech cast doubt on his
capacity to preside over any drug case." 178 The chief judge dismissed
the complaint, reasoning by analogy that "a judge's advocacy of the
abolition of diversity jurisdiction would not render the judge unfit to
179
hear cases in federal court on grounds of diversity."
The chief judge's conclusion, if not his rationale, is essentially
sound. The language in Canon 4 prohibiting law-related activities that
"cast reasonable doubt on the capacity to decide impartially any issue
that may come before the judge"180 is substantially similar to that in
the judicial disqualification statute which requires a judge's recusal in
"any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."'181 The similarity is not accidental. The Reporter's notes accompanying an almost identical Canon 4 provision in the 1972
American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct, explain that
"[a] judge's obligation of office is to be available to fulfill his judicial
duties; he must avoid quasi-judicial activities that are likely to lead to
his disqualification."' 182 In other words, a judge has engaged in conduct casting doubt on her ability to decide an issue impartially within
the meaning of Canon 4 if such conduct is likely to lead to
disqualification. 18s
disciplinary actions under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act. See 2 Guide to Judicial
Policies & Procedure, supra note 162, Canon 1 commentary at I-1. Hence, decisions rendered under the Act-such as the one discussed here-supplement the interpretive guidance offered by the Committee on Codes of Conduct.
177 Richard L. Marcus, Who Should Discipline Federal Judges, and How?, 149 F.R.D.
375, 405 (1993).
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 2 Guide

to Judicial Policies & Procedure, supra note 162, Canon 4, at 1-22.

181 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994).
182 Thode, supra note 167, at 74. Canon 4 of the 1972 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct
provided that "'[a] judge ... may engage in the following quasi-judicial activities, if in
doing so he does not cast doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may

come before him."' Id. at 18. Canon 4(B), in turn, provided that "'[a judge may] appear at
a public hearing before an executive or legislative body or official on matters concerning
the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, and he may otherwise consult
with an executive or legislative body or official, but only on matters concerning the administration of justice."' Id.
183 See Tacha, supra note 52, at 294-95 (discussing Canon 4 of ABA revised Model Code

of 1990 in terms of need for abstention).
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In Liteky v. United States, 184 the Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Scalia, opined that "'[p]artiality' does not refer to all
favoritism, but only to such as is, for some reason, wrongful or inappropriate."' 85 Favoritism is wrongful or inappropriate, and likely to
require disqualification, only if it is "undeserved, or... rests upon
knowledge that the [judge] ought not to possess... or... is excessive
in degree."'1 86 Put another way, a judge who forms an opinion of a
litigant over the course of judicial proceedings or who develops a view
of the law as a result of her experience on the bench has not compromised her impartiality.'8 7 To the contrary, she has done her duty as a
judge. 188 The traditional rule has thus been that only extrajudicial
89
bias constitutes grounds for disqualification.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Liteky, however, such a rule
is overly simplistic. 90 Inappropriate bias can be exhibited in the
course of judicial proceedings where "even though it springs from the
facts adduced or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme as to
display clear inability to render fair judgment."1 91 By the same token,
not all extrajudicial "bias" is inappropriate; the fact that a judge's
thinking is influenced by her "view of the law acquired in scholarly
reading," for example, is not a basis for recusal. 192
When a judge states-in dicta-that a statute may be invalid or
should be interpreted a particular way, the judge is not required to
disqualify herself in a later case from deciding the issue squarely, on
the grounds that her earlier statements cast doubt on her impartiality.
Recusal is unnecessary, not because the "favoritism" reflected in such
dicta had its genesis in the courtroom-it could as easily have been a
result of outside reading-but because that kind of "favoritism" is
neither wrongful nor inappropriate. The question, then, is whether
184 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994).
185 Id. at 1156.

Id. at 1155.
See In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1943) ("Impartiality is not
gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child-like innocence.").
188 See Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1155 ("The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant ....But the judge
is not thereby recusable for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings ....
").
189 See Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 243, 295-96 (1993).
190 See Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1156 (noting that extrajudicial source is neither necessary
nor sufficient to constitute grounds for recusal).
191 Id. at 1155; see also Geyh, supra note 189, at 296-302 (describing two series of cases
concerning judges "whose biases were not necessarily extrajudicial in origin, but were sufficiently extreme to cause the appellate courts to ignore the general rule excluding such
evidence from consideration").
186
187

192 Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 1157.
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"good" favoritism manifested in dicta somehow becomes "bad" favoritism when the identical remarks are offered in a different forum.
Some commentators have argued that the forum does make a difference-that the judge who leaves her chambers and travels to a congressional hearing room to help draft a law or argue its merits appears
to have abandoned her impartiality and embarked on a personal crusade. 193 In so concluding, however, these commentators fail to appreciate the need for a new, interactive paradigm and the impact such a
paradigm would have. They see no systemic need for judge-legislator
interaction on matters of law (except insofar as the law affects the
judiciary and its operations directly) and do not acknowledge a
judge's corresponding duty to assist the legislature in improving the
law.194 If they did, they would be compelled to reach a different conclusion, one that has been reached by other commentators: Because a
judge ought to assist in improving the law by communicating with legislators, the presumption should be that she is doing her duty when
she does so and not that she is undertaking a personal crusade that
calls her impartiality into question. 195
Consistent with the view that there is nothing inherently suspicious about judges participating in the legislative process, Canon 4 requires only that judges avoid comments to the effect that their views
on particular legislative proposals are so strongly held that they could

not decide cases arising under that legislation fairly. 196 This is not to
193 See, e.g., Kelso, supra note 6, at 863 ("Simply put, legislative drafting and lobbying is
the wrong place for judges to exercise their rights of expression in an effort to improve the
law.... A judge who wishes to contribute to legal development has to choose the proper
forum, such as a law review article or a speech before a bar group."); see also Ross, supra
note 167, at 615 (arguing that public commentary by judges creates dangerous -public perception that judges base their decisions upon their own predilections rather than upon
logic, precedent, or the facts").
194 See Kelso, supra note 6, at 864-65 ("Judges who want to be legislators should resign
their judicial office in order to devote themselves entirely to the political process."); Ross,
supra note 167, at 614 ("The judicial system ... has no overwhelming need for judges to
make extrajudicial comments.").
195 See, e.g., Mark Scott Bagula & Judge Robert C. Coates, Trustees of the Justice System: Quasi-Judicial Activity and the Failure of the 1990 ABA Model Code ofJudicialConduct, 31 San Diego L. Rev. 617, 634 (1994) (arguing that "[t]he 'occasional' duty to engage
in legal reform will only become more frequent as this decade passes" and that "the judges'
code of ethical conduct must not discourage the efforts of even a single judge who might
otherwise act to improve the legal system"); McKay, supra note 167, at 21 ("No one is
better qualified to speak on law reform... than judges. Even though the efforts necessary
to accomplish significant change are often substantial, no barrier should be raised against
judicial participation in such activities beyond assurance that the obligations of judicial
office are met.").
196 See 2 Guide to Judicial Policies & Procedure, supra note 162, ch. 1, Canon 4; see also
Thode, supra note 167, at 74 (arguing that judge could testify to his "'belie[f] that limited
statutory grounds for divorce are not in the public interest,"' and that "'[t]he law should be
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suggest that a judge's law reform activities are appropriate merely because they do not violate the Code of Conduct. Conduct falling short
of a Canon 4 violation may nevertheless cause long-term damage to
the judiciary's credibility and reputation. 197 That is an issue better
characterized as a prudential constraint, however, and is discussed in
Part III.
B. The Rulemaking Process
The judiciary's role in rulemaking, as in statutory reform, is subject to constitutional, statutory, and ethical constraints. In the case of
ethical constraints, the change of context from statutory to rule reform
adds no issues to those previously discussed and even takes some
away, in that the ethical propriety of the judiciary's involvement in the
development of its own operating procedures is not seriously disputed.198 With respect to constitutional and statutory constraints, the
analysis differs, but the conclusion does not: They impose few meaningful restrictions relative to the prudential constraints to be discussed
in Part III.
I credit the intrepid spelunker-scholars who have braved the
dark, the damp, and the guano to probe the depths of the federal judiciary's constitutional and statutory rulemaking power. I have opted
against following them into the cave, not because their work is done
(it's not) but because it is unnecessary for me to do so.
For my purposes, the following observations suffice. Congress, by
virtue of its powers to constitute the lower federal courts1 99 and to
make laws necessary and proper for executing all "[p]owers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof," 200 has legislative authority over federal court procedure. The federal judiciary has concurrent jurisdiction
over court procedure because Congress delegated procedural
201
rulemaking authority to the judiciary via the Rules Enabling Act,
changed to allow persons who no longer live in harmony to obtain a divorce,"' because It
would not "compromise [the] judge's capacity to apply impartially the law as written," but
should not testify that he "'will grant all divorce actions... whatever the strength of the
evidence to support the statutory ground for divorce-because [he] believe[d] that persons
who no longer live in harmony should be divorced"').
197 One could argue that such conduct constitutes a Canon 2 violation. See supra note
164 and accompanying text. The difficulty is that in most cases, the isolated judge's conduct is insufficiently extreme to threaten "public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." 2 Guide to Judicial Policies & Procedure, supra note 162, ch. 1, Canon
2(A). Rather, it is the cumulative effect of multiple episodes that poses the threat.
198 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
199 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
200 Id. cl. 18.
201 Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994)).
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and because the judiciary has some measure of inherent authority to
regulate its procedure, in the absence of, if not in the teeth of, a contrary congressional directive.202 At the same time, the federal judiciary is forbidden by the Rules of Decision and Rules Enabling Acts, if
not by the Constitution, from promulgating rules that modify substantive law.20 3
The point at which procedure (and the judiciary's rulemaking authority) ends and substance begins changes with the context. When
courts exercise their inherent authority to regulate procedure in diversity cases in the absence of a formal federal rule or statute, the boundary between permissible "procedural" rules and impermissible
"substantive" rules is crossed when the rule in question violates the
so-called "twin aims" of the Erie doctrine, by encouraging forum
shopping or by precipitating inequitable administration of state law, in
derogation of the Rules of Decision Act and federalism principles.2 0
In contrast, formal rules promulgated by the Judicial Conference,
approved by the Supreme Court, and acquiesced in by Congress under
the aegis of the Rules Enabling Act, are presumptively procedural.205
202 In the absence of a statute or a rule promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling
Act, judges may develop informal procedural rules necessary to facilitate the orderly administration of justice in their courtrooms. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S.
22,27 n.6 (1988) (explaining that in diversity cases federal judge-made law will trump inconsistent state law, provided that federal law is procedural within meaning of Erie). In
addition to the federal judge's inherent authority to fill minor procedural gaps overlooked
by statutes and formal rules, some have argued that the judiciary's inherent authority gives
the judiciary the exclusive right to regulate its own procedures in certain instances--statutory directives to the contrary notwithstanding. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Power
and the Rules Enabling Act, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 733, 733-34, 754 (1995) (arguing that
Supreme Court has effectively acknowledged inherent authority of judiciary to make procedural rules).
203 See Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994) ("The laws of the several states
... shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States."); Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)-(b) (1994) ("Supreme Court... rules
... for cases in the United States district courts.. shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right."); Erie _R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938) (holding that, because there is no "federal general common law," in determining substantive rights, federal
courts in diversity actions must rely upon state law).
204 See 28 U.S.C. § 1652; Stewart, 487 U.S. at 27 n.6 (noting that where "application of
federal judge-made law would disserve [twin aims of Erie doctrine], the district court
should apply state law"); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (elucidating "twin
aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
administration of the laws"); Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-80 (holding that federal courts in diversity
cases should apply substantive state law, whether it is statutory or common law).
25 See Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987) ("Moreover, the study and
approval given each proposed Rule by the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference,
and this Court, and the statutory requirement that the Rule be reported to Congress for a
period of review before taking effect, see 28 U.S.C. § 2072, give the Rules presumptive
validity under both the constitutional and statutory constraints." (citation to Hanna, 380
U.S. at 471, omitted)).
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That presumption is not overcome if the rules "incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights," as long as they are "reasonably necessary to
maintain the integrity of that system of rules. '206 Whether the Court's
broad definition of procedure is appropriate, and if so, under what
circumstances a so-called "procedural" rule should be deemed to cross
the line from procedure to substance, remain the subject of active
07
debate.
The constitutional and statutory constraints on the judiciary's formal rulemaking power are ultimately of marginal consequence here,
because they delineate only the theoretical limits of the judiciary's
lawmaking authority. The judiciary promulgates the rules and then
passes on their constitutional and statutory validity in subsequent litigation. While there is the theoretical possibility that the Supreme
Court would approve a rule only to declare it unlawful later, the Court
has yet to do so, 208 and the likelihood that the Court will drag itself by
the ear out to the woodshed anytime soon seems remote.
III
THE PRIMACY OF PRUDENTIAL CONSTRAINTS
ON JUDGE-LEGISLATOR INTERACTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF STATUTES AND RULES

Taken together, the constitutional, statutory, and ethical constraints on judge-legislator interaction impose insignificant limits on

the information judges can impart to legislators. This is not to say that
there are no meaningful limits upon such communication. Even if one
accepts that aggressive judicial lobbying and expansive judicial
rulemaking are lawful and ethical, it would not compel the conclusion
that they are prudent-interactive paradigm notwithstanding. To the
contrary, the paradigm depends for its success upon the continued

ability of the judiciary to influence Congress, an ability that could be
and already is being compromised by arguably imprudent lobbying
and rulemaking strategies. In this Part of the Article, I will discuss
these strategies, their potentially deleterious effect on the interbranch
relationship, and the prudential limits on judge-legislator interaction
that ought to be respected if the goals of the interactive paradigm are
to be realized.
206 Id. at 5.

207 See, e.g., Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 59 (5th ed. 1994) (discussing
substance-procedure distinction in context of Erie doctrine).
208 See Ralph U. Whitten, Erie and the Federal Rules: A Review and Reappraisal After
Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods, 21 Creighton L. Rev. 1 (1987).
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A. Interactionand Acrimony in the New
Judge-LegislatorRelationship
1. Accusations of Judicial Self-Interest in Statutory Reform
As the judiciary's profile in the legislative process has risen, so
too have attacks on the judiciary's credibility. Some commentators
have suggested that the judiciary has compromised its impartiality by
lobbying openly.209 Within Congress, legislators and committees have
begun to challenge the judiciary's tactics, motives, and expertise.
In 1990, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Joseph Biden
lambasted the Judicial Conference for its "over-wrought response"210
to the proposed Civil Justice Reform Act, its failure to "reexamine
[its] rhetoric, ' 211 and its lobbying behavior. As recounted in the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, the Judicial Conference had designated a special task force to be its exclusive representative in
negotiations with the Senate Judiciary Committee over the bill 212 but
ultimately opposed the legislation on the basis of an eleventh-hour
recommendation from the Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial
Improvements, a committee with which the Senate Judiciary Committee had had no prior contact.213 The Senate Judiciary Committee Report concluded: "Such actions only serve to undermine the
cooperative relationship between Congress and the judicial branch
that our citizens rightly expect and deserve. It is the committee's
hope-and indeed, its expectation-that this troubling process will
214
not recur.1
Acrimony over the Civil Justice Reform Act spilled over into a
companion title of the 1990 Judicial Improvements package that called
for an increase in the number of federal judgeships. Chairman Biden
openly questioned the Judicial Conference's process of determining
where new judgeships were needed, noting that "[e]very single recom209 See, e.g., Carolyn Elefant, 'Shameless' Judges Should Be Removed, Legal Times,
Feb. 20, 1989, at 19 (letter from editor by staff attorney of Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission) (arguing that judges should not be allowed to lobby for higher salaries);
Kenneth Jost, Ending 'Judicial Lockjaw': Guidelines for Speaking Out, Legal Times, Sept.
28, 1987, at 26 (arguing that Supreme Court justices should refrain from many forms of
extrajudicial activity); Larry Lempert, Judges Run Into Ethical Problems in Lobbying
Fight, Legal Tmes, Apr. 4, 1983, at 11 (noting substantial judicial lobbying with regard to
Congress's proposed bankruptcy jurisdiction legislation and questioning whether such activity "steers clear of Canon 4 shoals"); see also supra note 193 and accompanying text.
210 Civil Justice Reform Act Hearings, supra note 126, at 310 (statement of Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary).

211

Id.

212 See S. Rep. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.

6802, 6806-07.
213 See id. at 5, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6807.
214 Id.
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mendation regarding the court of appeals made by the Judicial Conference corresponds exactly to what the circuit council of each circuit
asked for. '215 He added that this "whatever you want, you get" approach was received with "astonishment in the Justice Department as
well as here among Democrats as well as Republicans" and declared
that "[w]hen it comes to playing politics and doling out patronage, the
Judicial Conference has no equal that I have seen before this
21 6
Committee."
In April 1991, the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts submitted a "judicial impact assessment" to the Senate Judici2 17
ary Committee on the proposed Violence Against Women Act.
The bill, which created a private cause of action in federal court for
victims of certain types of domestic and street violence, troubled many
federal judges because it continued a trend begun in the criminal law
arena to crowd federal dockets with cases traditionally litigated in
state courts. Their fears were quantified by the impact assessment,
which estimated that the bill would add 13,450 cases to federal court
dockets at a cost of $43.6 million and 450 staff years218 -an obvious
threat to the viability of the legislation, if true. The Senate Judiciary
Committee Report, however, dismissed the judiciary's figures out of
hand as "wild estimates" that were "based on [an] improper interpretation of the statute" and were "obviously inaccurate, 2' 19 thereby implying that the Committee regarded the impact assessment as little
more than the judiciary's self-interested effort to cook the books.
That same year the Senate Appropriations Committee accused
the Judicial Conference of basing its budget request upon "overestimated" caseload statistics, which the Committee found "particularly
problematic during periods of constrained budgets. ' 22 0 In the future,
"[t]he Committee expect[ed] that the courts will improve the process
'
by which they estimate resource requirements."2'
The judiciary has
been submitting an annual budget estimate to Congress since 1939,222
so it is unlikely that its confrontation with the Appropriations Committee is directly attributable to a new, more aggressively interactive
215 Civil Justice Reform Act Hearings, supra note 126, at 308 (statement of Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary).
216 Id.

217 See Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-20 (1992) (considering bill designed
to combat violence and crimes against women).
218 See id. at 16.
219 Id. at 70.
220 S. Rep. No. 331, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1992).
221 Id.
222 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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judiciary. The imbroglio did, however, manifest a degree of congressional skepticism traditionally absent from the interbranch
relationship.
More recently, the judiciary came under a sustained attack in
Congress for the way in which it lobbied the General Services Administration (GSA) in connection with the courthouse construction program. In late 1994, the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee staff issued a report blaming recent increases in the judiciary's courthouse construction budget on the judiciary's involvement 2 3 The report noted that "[p]rior to 1987, the U.S. Judiciary had
little involvement in the design and construction of courthouses," but
that since then "the courts have been more aggressive about influencing the construction process."' z 4 The report found that "the increasing role of Federal judges in the design and construction of
courthouses has resulted in unnecessary expenditures"; 225 that "[i]n
some cases, judges have improperly pressured GSA to waive procurement rules and steer contracts to certain firms"; 226 and that the Administrative Office's courthouse design guide, "more than anything
else, has been used by judges to justify lavish furnishings and costly
changes in the design of new buildings."227 The literal bottom line of
the Report: "Committee staff recommends that GSA develop new
procurement guidelines for courthouse construction. At minimum,
the new guidelines should limit the role of U.S. judges in the contracting process."= Despite the arguments of federal judges that
they were merely seeking to create dignified venues comparable to
those afforded representatives of the other branches of government,
some legislators were unpersuaded,2 9 and one, Senator Max Baucus,
declared his intention to introduce legislation to limit the judiciary's
influence over future courthouse construction.230
223 See Majority Staff of Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess., Investigation of the Federal Courthouse Construction Program 1 (Comm. Print
1994) (finding lack of cost controls in courthouse construction program).
224 Id. at 11.

225 Id.
226 Id.

at 1.

227 Id. at 31.
228 Id.
229 Representative

John Duncan declared that he was "critical of the courthouse
projects all over the country." Ralph Ranalli, Critics Keep Heat on Fan Pier Courthouse
Plan, Boston Herald, June 7,1994, at 24. Senator Byron Dorgan described the courthouses

as "extravagant, radically overpriced and substantially overbuilt." Kathleen Kerr, Foley
Square: Opulence in the Courts Project Part of Fed Building Spree, N.Y. Newvsday, May 1,
1994, at A51.
230 See Constance Johnson, Federal Judiciary's Budget Comes Under Scrutiny to
Judges' Dismay, Wall St. J., June 20, 1995, at B10.
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In December 1995, Senator Charles Grassley, Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, announced
that he would circulate an extensive questionnaire to all federal
judges, asking them how they spend their time on judicial activities,
how they use support staff, and how much time they commit to extrajudicial activities.231 Although one could spin the questionnaire as a
new avenue for judge-legislator communication, Senator Grassley offered it in a spirit of skepticism rather than cooperation, and it was so
received. 232 Federal judges, including Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, criticized the proposed questionnaire; in his 1995 YearEnd Report on the Federal Judiciary the Chief Justice warned that
"the subject matter of the questions and the detail required for answering them could amount to an unwarranted and ill-considered effort to micro-manage the work of the federal judiciary. 2' 33 Senator
Grassley was unmoved by the judiciary's criticisms, observing that
"the very same judges who maybe think I shouldn't be questioning
them applaud when I find waste in the Pentagon," a double standard
he attributed to judicial "arrogance." 234 He distributed the questionnaires as scheduled.2 35
These recent altercations do not undercut the desirability of an
interactive paradigm. Congress needs the judiciary's expertise to
make informed legislative choices, and the judiciary needs informed
legislative choices to maintain control of its dockets and preserve the
integrity of the judicial process. What these altercations do portend is
the birth of a new skepticism coloring the judiciary's interactions with
Congress in the legislative process.
Professor Christopher Smith advocates this new breed of skepticism in his recent book, Judicial Self Interest. Federal Judges and
Court Administration.236 His study of the federal judiciary's role in
legislative lobbying, case decisionmaking, and self-administration led
him to conclude that "analysts must look carefully at judges' claims
about the needs and 'best interests' of the judicial branch because
231 See Neil A. Lewis, Survey to Press U.S. Judges on Caseload and Expenses, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 17. 1995, at 35.
232 See id. (reporting that Grassley questionnaire was motivated by "his suspicion that
judges probably are not working hard enough").
233 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 1995 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary
3-4 (Jan. 1, 1996).
2M Lewis, supra note 231, at 35. It should be noted that Senator Grassley's remarks
predated Chief Justice Rehnquist's year-end report and were offered in response to other
federal judges who raised similar concerns.
235 See Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, U.S. Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, Judicial Survey (Jan. 1996) (on file with author).
236 Smith, supra note 8, at 127-34.
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such claims will frequently obscure the judges' self-interested personal
motivations for preserving and enhancing their own positions in the
system."3 7 In the context of legislative reform, he observed, judges
"watch closely to ensure that proposed reforms do not threaten their
status, autonomy, and power."238 He therefore recommended that
Congress oversee judicial administration in a "less deferential fashion"239 and concluded that "[I]egislators should view critically the

claims of federal judges about court administration and actively solicit
alternative viewpoints from interested students of judicial affairs in
academia and interest groups."2 40

2. Accusations of Judicial Self-Interest in Rule Reform
As with the judiciary's role in statutory development, its role in
rulemaking has been accompanied by a new skepticism of the judiciary's motives and credibility. Representatives of litigation user groups
have accused the Judicial Conference of being an elitist corps of
unelected officials who are unrepresentative of the public they ostensibly serve in the rulemaking process, 241 and whose rulemaking activi-

ties are influenced if not dictated by self-interest.242 They have
characterized the Conference as "a few ... voices in the wilderness,"
willing to disregard the "many, many thousands more" who represent
the spectrum of litigation consumers, 243 and they have successfully
237
238
239
240
241

Id. at 133.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 133.

This perception has manifested itself in the form of calls to make rules committee
advisory groups more representative. See, e.g., Rules Enabling Act Hearings, supra note
57, at 58.
242 See Court Reform and Access Hearings, supra note 27, at 364-65 (statement of Professor Laura Macklin) (observing that judges "have a strong set of institutional interests,
such as docket control and case management, which have become increasing [sic] emergent
and visible in recent years, so the thinking that they bring to bear in evaluating rules proposals may well be limited by their institutional roles" (footnote omitted)); see also
Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J.
Legal Stud. 627, 627-29 (1994) (pointing out that procedural rules are promulgated and
construed almost entirely by judges and that rules often produce results inconsistent with
efficiency).
243 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1993) [hereinafter Federal Rules Amendments Hearings] (statement of Alfred Cortese, Jr., Esq., Lawyers for Civil Justice) (opposing proposed
discovery rule changes); see also Rules Enabling Act Hearings, supra note 57, at 183 (letter
from Alan B. Morrison, Director of the Public Citizen Litigation Group, to Judge Edward
T. Gignoux (Aug. 20,1982)) ("[P]ublic comments (not only mine) seem to have little effect
on the decision-makers .... While it is possible that suggestions from the public are in fact
considered, the outward appearance is to the contrary.").
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lobbied Congress to open the rulemaking process to the public on the
grounds that no government official can be trusted to make decisions
244
behind closed doors after Watergate.
As discussed in Part I, members of Congress and their interested
constituents recently have begun to interpret the substance-procedure
distinction independently of the courts and are increasingly likely to
call judiciary-proposed rules "substantive" because they influence litigation outcomes long before the courts will call them "substantive"
because they violate the Rules Enabling Act. 45 Congress therefore
must police judicial rulemaking more actively, litigation user groups
have argued, because the elitist, self-interested, countermajoritarian
courts should not be trusted to develop rules that affect substantive
6
rights. 24
The deepest, darkest fears of many litigation user groups were
intensified by the Judicial Conference Rules Advisory Committee's
approach to discovery rules promulgated in 1993. The Rules Committee's decision to move forward with mandatory disclosure reform in
the absence of empirical support and in the teeth of intense and almost universal opposition from the organized bar seemed to confirm
the growing suspicion that the judiciary was pursuing an agenda
independent of the public good.2 47
Professor Jonathan Macey has organized these sentiments into a
coherent theory of judicial rulemaking behavior, rooted in public
choice, that "[s]tart[s] with the assumption that judges seek to maximize self-interest. '248 Professor Macey regards such an assumption as
"particularly valid in the context of a discussion about procedural
rules" because they are not only interpreted but also promulgated by
judges.24 9 He hypothesizes that judges further their own self-interest
by maximizing their leisure time, power, and reputation, and to that
244

As one witness observed:

So many of the proceedings that surrounded [the Watergate] incident occurred
in an air of secrecy that the public became naturally suspicious of any proceeding conducted outside the view of the public. In the public's eyes, the judiciary
was the symbol of fairness in the "Watergate" incidents. For the judiciary to
have compelled disclosure in so many instances in those cases, and yet to foreclose the public's access to its own rule-making proceedings has the potential
of doing some violence to the public's image of our judicial system.
Rules Enabling Act Hearings, supra note 57, at 43 (prepared statement of James F.
Holderman, Esq., Chairman, Subcommittee on the Rules Enabling Act, Criminal Justice
Section, on Behalf of the ABA).
245 See supra notes 118-19, 130-31 and accompanying text.
246 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
247 See generally Federal Rules Amendments Hearings, supra note 243 (letters and testimony of representatives of bar organizations opposed to mandatory disclosure).
248 Macey, supra note 242, at 629.
249 Id. at 627.
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end will promulgate rules that are inefficient and not in the public
interest whenever the public interest and judicial self-interest diverge3 50 There is room in his theory for public-spirited judges, but as
with public choice theory generally, ideological, other-oriented behavior maintains a decidedly low profile.2s1 In the end Macey, like
Smith,5 2 cautions us that when judges "are heard to complain about
their ever-increasing caseloads... [one should note that] while such
complaints may be useful in allowing judges to extract more resources
3
from Congress, these complaints may be exaggerated."2
Taking up where Professor Macey left off,25 4 the public choice
theorist would say that litigation user groups are now beginning to
recognize that judicial administration and procedural lawmaking are
the equivalent of "agenda-setting" mechanisms that influence, if not
dictate, case outcomes. 55 Borrowing a simile from Professor Linda
See id. at 627, 631.
Professor Macey argues that judges like the flexibility to "make discretionary decisions... quickly and with a minimum of outside interference," because it maximizes their
leisure time as well as their ability to further "their own view of the good." Id. at 631.
Public choice theory has been criticized for its failure to take sufficient account of
ideological motivations. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of
Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873,892-93 (1987) (describing public choice models of legislation as "rejectfing] ... ideology as a significant factor in the political process"). But see
Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public
Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 Tex. L Rev. 993, 997-98 (1988) (arguing
that public choice theory does account for ideology in voting behavior); Daniel A. Farber
& Philip P. Frickey, Integrating Public Choice and Public Law. A Reply to DeBow and
Lee, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1013, 1018 (1988) (arguing that if ideology is simply added to list of
"taste[s]" that animate voting behavior, public choice theory "can explain anything" and is
thus tautological).
252 See supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
253 Macey, supra note 242, at 645.
254 For reasons that are unclear, Professor Macey concludes that Congress has been
either insufficiently able to interfere significantly with the judiciary's rulemaking monopoly
or has been insufficiently interested in doing so, a characterization at odds with Congress's
numerous forays into the rulemaking arena during the past two decades. See id. at 628,
646.
255 For the public choice theorist, substantive legislative outcomes are unprincipled in
part because outcomes can be dictated by the agenda setter. Professors Farber and Frickey
offer an elegant illustration of this paradox first described by Kenneth Arrow. Three children are going to choose a pet by majority vote: Alice wants a dog most, a parrot second,
and a cat third; Bobby wants a parrot most, a cat second, and a dog third; and Cindy wants
a cat first, a dog second, and a parrot third. If Cindy is the agenda setter, she can get her
cat by scheduling the first vote between dog and parrot-Alice and Cindy vote dog, and
parrot drops out. She can then schedule the second vote between dog and cat-Bobby and
Cindy vote cat, and cat wins. If, on the other hand, Alice is the agenda setter, she can get
her dog by pitting cat against parrot in the first round of voting-Bobby and Alice vote
parrot, and cat drops out. In the second round, Alice can schedule parrot against dogAlice and Cindy vote dog, and dog wins. Bobby, in turn could get his parrot by pair-voting
dog versus cat in round one (cat wins) and cat versus parrot in round two (parrot wins).
See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 Va. L
250
251
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Mullenix, user groups, like any five-year-old, know that the one "who
gets to make the rules of the game has the greatest chance of winning. '' 25 6 If unelected federal judges control these agenda-setting
mechanisms, they will favor rules and statutes that maximize their
self-interest in power, prestige, and leisure time, at the expense of litigation user group interests.25 7 If, on the other hand, legislators retain
a significant measure of control, they will maximize their self-interest
in reelection by favoring rules and statutes supported by their constituents and contributors-i.e., litigation user groups. 258 Litigation user
groups thus can be expected to challenge judge-made rules and seek
legislative intervention with increasing frequency.
3. The Strengths and Limitations of JudicialSelf-Interest as an
Explanatory Device
Professor Macey's public choice model of rulemaking explains
too much, in the sense that one can manipulate judicial "appetites" for
power, leisure, and prestige to explain or predict just about any
rulemaking outcome one desires. For example, if the Judicial Conference amends Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (as it did in 1983) to
require that judges impose sanctions against litigants who file frivolous claims, it is because judges want to maximize both their leisure
time, by ridding themselves of frivolous litigation, and their prestige,
by confining their dockets to challenging and important cases. On the
other hand, if the Conference amends the rule (as it did in 1993) to
permit but not require judges to impose such sanctions, it is because
judges want to maximize their power by expanding the scope of their
discretionary authority. If it amends the rule (consistent with the Republican Contract with America) to make the judgment loser pay the
winner's costs without regard to whether the loser's claim is frivolous,
it is because judges want to maximize their leisure time by discouraging litigants from filing any claims at all. Finally, if the Conference
eliminates the rule altogether, it is because the rulemakers want to
Rev. 423, 426 n.9 (1988); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance:
Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 275, 28384 (1988) (illustrating so-called "Arrow's paradox," in which agenda setter can control
legislative outcome by manipulating sequence in which proposals are voted upon). In
other words, procedure can dictate substance.
256 Mullenix, supra note 7, at 801.
257 Public choice theorists posit that legislators are self-interested, that self-interested
legislators want to be reelected, and that they therefore can be expected to cast votes that
maximize their prospects for reelection. See Eskridge, supra note 255, at 288 (illustrating
strategies legislators use to enhance their chances of reelection). Self-interested federal
judges, by corollary, want power, prestige, and leisure time and can be expected to craft
rules and judicial decisions accordingly.
258 See id. (arguing that legislators attempt to please constituents).
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maximize their prestige and leisure time by jettisoning timeconsuming and tedious satellite litigation of Rule 11 motions that they
regard as beneath them, in favor of more summary methods of
disposition.
In other words, Professor Macey's formulation of judicial selfinterest can explain almost every conceivable rule change. To the extent that desires for power, prestige, and leisure work in opposition to
each other, a rule favoring one such interest will disfavor anotherevery hour a rule requires the judge to wield her power is an hour she
will not be tanning herself by the pool. Thus, every rule change can be
explained in terms of whichever interest is favored-never mind the
interest that is disfavored. Likewise, insofar as one facet of a given
interest comes at the expense of another facet of that same interest,
every rule can be explained in terms of whichever facet is maximized.
Therefore, a rule requiring the judge to exercise power she did not
have before is explicable because it increases her absolute power (as it
decreases her discretionary power), while a repeal of that rule is explicable because it increases her discretionary power (as it decreases her
absolute power).
At the same time as it explains too much, the premise that judges
are motivated solely by appetites for leisure time, prestige, and power
explains too little, because it fails to account adequately for the complexity of human motivation. As Professor Janet Cooper Alexander
points out, Professor Macey overlooks gender, racial, ethnic, socioeconomic, and other biases that may influence judicial behavior to at least
as great an extent as leisure, prestige, or power concerns259 Even
Judge Richard Posner, who like Macey seeks to explain judicial behavior in terms of self-interest, adds a layer of complexity, arguing that
"judicial voting"-the satisfaction that comes with deciding cases (and
presumably, making procedural rules)-is a more significant part of
the "judicial utility function" than leisure, prestige, or power.M Judge
Posner stops there, however, and refuses to accept that judges "desire
to promote or maximize the public interest," because that would be
"inconsistent with an approach that treats judges as 'ordinary' human
beings." 2 61
259 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment

on Macey, 23 J. Legal Stud. 647, 648, 661-65 (1994) (examining possible biases of predominantly "white, male, middle-aged or older, and wealthy" judiciary).
260 See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 13-20 (1993) (arguing that judges value

their voting powers highly).
261 Id. at 14.
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Judge Posner's theory is likewise too simplistic. "Ordinary," selfinterested human beings routinely seek to promote the interests of
others, because it maximizes other "appetites," such as those for fame,
respect, love, personal satisfaction, eternal salvation, and so on.
Moreover, the notion that federal judges are presumptively no different from "ordinary" human beings strikes me as wrong. An "ordinary" murderer, martyr, or judge is not an "ordinary" person because
each has self-selected into a group that is, almost by definition, extraordinary. In the case of federal judges, one reasonably might anticipate that individuals with appetites sated by public-spirited behavior
will be selected in disproportionate numbers to occupy a post that
calls for a lifetime of public service. In short, self-interest explains
judicial conduct only if self-interest is defined broadly to account for
other-oriented behavior. With such a definition, however, the public
choice model becomes tautological and explains nothing.262
If one accepts my argument that judges can and do seek to further the public good in satisfaction of their broadly defined selfinterest, difficulties nevertheless can arise in at least two situations:
first, when the judiciary weighs its narrow interests in power, prestige,
and leisure against its broader interest in promoting the public good
and takes a position that furthers the former at the expense of the
latter; and second, when the judiciary takes a position intended to promote the public good that is perceived by Congress or its constituents
as promoting the judiciary's narrow self-interest at the expense of the
public good. There is room for disagreement as to whether and which
of the recent judge-legislator altercations exemplify the former situation or the latter, but as discussed below, in both cases the long-term
impact on the judiciary's influence over statutory reform and rulemaking is deleterious.
B. Sources of the Judiciary'sExtrajudicialInfluence in Congress
and the Impact of InterbranchAcrimony
As documented in the foregoing section, the judiciary has weathered a recent series of attacks on its credibility, attacks arising out of
what members of Congress and their interested constituents have
characterized as self-serving lobbying and rulemaking strategies.
Other lobbyists routinely confront accusations that their positions are
animated by self, not public interest, but judges and the Judicial Conference are not ordinary legislative lobbyists. For example, private
sector lobbyists routinely campaign for, make contributions to, and
262 See supra note 251.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

November 19961

PARADISE LOST, PARADIGM FOUND

attend functions for congressional candidatesm 3 One need not be a
hardened cynic to appreciate the value of such undertakings to the
lobbying enterprise, 4 The Judicial Conference, in contrast, may not
exploit these means of influence. The Code of Conduct for United
States Judges provides that a judge should not "publicly endorse or
oppose a candidate for public office[,] ...

make a contribution to a

political organization or candidate, attend political gatherings, or
purchase tickets for political party dinners, or other functions."'20
Private organizations also may lobby at the grass roots level by
urging members and nonmembers of the organization to contact their
representatives on particular legislative proposals.2 6 The Judicial
Conference, on the other hand, speaks for a meager 900 judges scattered across 435 legislative districts and is forbidden by statute from
reaching beyond its membership to solicit grass roots support for legislation of interest to the judiciary. 6 7

The Judicial Conference likewise lacks the lobbying firepower of
its counterpart in the executive branch. The President can threaten to
veto objectionable legislation as a means to alter its course, a power
263 See Bruce C. Wolpe, Lobbying Congress: How the System Works 44-47 (1990)
(describing financial and political support lobbyists routinely give to legislators).
264 Commentator, lobbyist, and former congressional staffer Bruce C. WVolpe explained:
It is essential for those with business before Congress to support those
legislators who are their allies. There is nothing wrong with it; there is everything right with it....
...Political contributions can promote your political profile with a legislator.... Political contributions can promote access to legislators....
... Regular contributors attend dozens of fundraisers a year and become
part of the "circuit" of lobbyists around a cadre of lawmakers and their comContacts are made, relationships formed, and networks
mittees ....
established.
Id. at 44-45.
265 2 Guide to Judicial Policies & Procedure, supra note 162, ch. 1, Canon 7(A)(2)-(3).
266 One longtime lobbyist elaborated upon the value of grass roots lobbying in a "howto" book for corporation and trade association executives:
With all the skills the most talented lobbyist can bring to bear, there is one
thing they cannot do for most of the legislators they cultivate, and that is vote
for them....
.
By mobilizing informed local members of the organization... the
lobbyists extend, multiply, and reinforce their efforts in every legislative district into which they can reach. Provided some understanding of the issues is
reflected, 100 calls, visits, or letters from back home provide substantial and
impressive support for the position the direct lobbyist is urging a legislator to
adopt. Communications from 500 constituents are overwhelming, even for a
member of Congress representing half a million people.
Charles S. Mack, Lobbying and Government Relations: A Guide for Executives 123-24
(1989).
2
See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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without corollary in the judiciary.268 Unlike the Judicial Conference,
the President has direct access to the electorate through the electronic
media and can urge voters to contact their representatives and support or oppose a given measure. These formidable powers, in turn,
give executive branch lobbyists additional leverage to barter for the
President's support or acquiescence on a given matter in exchange for
congressional assistance on some other proposal of particular interest
269
to the executive branch.
After the lobbying powers denied judges and the Judicial Conference are excluded, what remains-over and above the merits of their
270
position on a given issue-is their competence and credibility.
Competence and credibility are assets on the balance sheets of most
268 One commentator described a comparable phenomenon on the state level. See
Glenn Abney, Lobbying by the Insiders: Parallels of State Agencies and Interest Groups,
48 Pub. Admin. Rev. 911, 911 (1988) ("Even if the [executive] has not endorsed legislation,
the [executive] may be a significant factor in an agency's lobbying. The threat or use of a[n
executive] veto may help an agency out of a difficult situation.").
269 See, e.g., Michael Wines, Reporter's Notebook; The Joy of Being Undecided: Senators Bask in the Lights, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1993, at 1 (reporting concessions undecided
legislators extracted from President Clinton in exchange for support on budget bill).
270 Although it is outside the scope of this Article, an additional power unique to the
judiciary is that it can bypass credibility-threatening, extrajudicial activity altogether
through judicial decisionmaking. The Supreme Court's habeas corpus decisions are a recent example of the Court accomplishing through case law what it could not accomplish
through formal rulemaking or legislative lobbying. See Smith, supra note 8, at 69-89 (discussing judicial reform of habeas corpus procedures); see also Larry W. Yackle, The
Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2331, 2331-33 (1993) (same). Because this form of
judicial activism is generally regarded as inconsistent with the judicial role, it can invite
criticism even more withering than that directed at confrontational, extrajudicial lobbying
on the same issue, which may help to explain why it is not used more frequently.
For example, in Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 892, 900 (D. Mass. 1991),
District Judge Keeton "extend[ed] specificity of pleading requirements to CERCLA
cases," despite the fact that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) imposed such requirements only in cases of fraud and mistake. Shortly thereafter, Chief Justice Rehnquist authored an opinion in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), in which the Supreme Court invalidated expansion of Rule 9(b)
particularity requirements to include § 1983 cases, concluding that "[p]erhaps if Rule[ ]...
9 were rewritten today," the specificity requirement might be expanded, "[b]ut that is a
result which must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by
judicial interpretation." Id. at 168.
Professors Richard L. Marcus, Martin H. Redish, and Edward F. Sherman juxtapose
these cases in their civil procedure textbook and note that "Judge Keeton was, at the time
of the decision in the Cash Energy case, the Chair of the Judicial Conference Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, which oversees the amendment of the
rules. He was appointed to that position by Chief Justice Rehnquist." Richard L. Marcus
et al., Civil Procedure: A Modem Approach 164 (2d ed. 1995). The Supreme Court had to
know that formally amending Rule 9 to make life more difficult for plaintiffs in environmental and civil rights cases was politically impracticable, but it was unwilling to amend the
rule informally, through creative judicial construction.
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good lobbyists. 271 But judges, by virtue of their present stations and
past activities, possess such assets in abundance.
Competence: As extraordinary lawyers who, with rare exception,
have abandoned other pursuits to dedicate the remainder of their professional lives to the federal bench, 272 judges are uniquely qualified
experts who can offer valuable insights into the effects of legislative
reform on the third branch. Indeed, an essential tenet of the new,
interactive paradigm is that judges have indispensable expertise that
273
they should share with legislators.
It bears emphasizing that such expertise includes, but is not limited to, matters of court practice and procedure, judicial pay and perquisites, and judicial administration. As lawyers who adjudicate,
judges acquire special knowledge on general issues of law that lawyers
who advise, litigate, or legislate may lack. Judge William W
Schwarzer, then-Director of the Federal Judicial Center, offered a
good example to the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration: "[T]here is considerable information that would be helpful to Congress within the judiciary. Probably nobody knows better how mandatory minimum
sentences work in practice than the judges who have to impose
them."2 74 It therefore "would be useful to have a constant flow of
information from the judiciary to the Congress."2 75 Legislators and
commentators have noted the contributions that judges can make to
legislative reform efforts on subjects as diverse as environmental regulation and copyright protection. 276
271 See Wolpe, supra note 263, at 9-15 (outlining five "commandments" of good lobbying, all of which focus on preserving lobbyist's credibility with legislators and their staffs);
id. at 45 (identifying expertise and contributions as "two routes of access to legislators for a
lobbyist").
272 See Van Tassel, supra note 50, at 345 (reporting that between 1789 and 1993 only 190
of 2627 federal judges-a mere 7%-left bench for reasons other than health or age).
273 See supra notes 52, 82-84.
274 Federal Judiciary Administration Hearing, supra note 28, at 105 (statement of Judge
William W Schwarzer).
275 Id. at 106. More is at issue here than the simple transmission of facts and figuresjudges are human beings with human reactions to events taking place in their courtrooms
that they are uniquely positioned to share. For example, two years before Judge Schwarzer
testified at the above-cited hearing, he choked back tears in open court at the point of
imposing a mandatory minimum sentence for a drug offense that he believed to be excessive under the circumstances. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Ten Years for Two Ounces, Am. Law.,
Mar. 1990, at 65, 66.
276 Former Representative Robert Kastenmeier credited three federal judges with making a significant contribution to the development of copyright legislation under consideration by his subcommittee. See Building Bridges, supra note 49, at 169. Professor Robert
Katzmann, in turn, observed that judges "have had lots of experience with the technical
problems" associated with implementation of laws such as the Clean Air Act and therefore
should be consulted when the law is revised. Id. at 168.
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The net effect is that legislators rely on judges as sources of expert advice. Former Congressman Robert Kastenmeier estimated that
"hundreds of judges at all levels" had testified before him in his
roughly twenty years as Chairman of the House Judicial Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice. 277 "Without that resource," he concluded, "we would indeed be
limited." 278
Credibility:Judges enter the legislative process with an aura of integrity that is difficult to equal. It comes with the robe. Judge
Richard Neely puts it nicely:
The public's willing acquiescence in government-by-judiciary is
directly related to the judiciary's incomparable reputation for fairness and honesty....
Courts have neither the power of the purse nor the power of
the sword. Therefore, judges must capitalize on their prestige to
elicit willing compliance with their orders.
Nothing is more important for the success of courts than a perception by litigants that judges are somehow larger than
life-pri279
estlike figures applying an arcane but curative science.
Although it may be hyperbolic to characterize any lobbyist as
"priestlike," judge or not, there is ample support for the proposition
that judges are, by virtue of their stations, given added deference in
the legislative process.280
Apart from the halo of integrity that accompanies the position,
the judge-lobbyist's credibility is further augmented by the relationships she has formed with individual legislators-relationships often
Id. at 169.
Id.; see also Federal Judiciary Administration Hearing, supra note 28, at 113 (statement of Subcommittee Chairman William J. Hughes) ("[Judges and the Judicial Conference] are in a unique position. [They] are in the only position really to provide the insights
from the perspective of the judiciary. That information is very important to us.").
279 Richard Neely, Judicial Jeopardy: When Business Collides with the Courts 55-56
(1986).
280 The respect and credibility that Congress affords judges in the legislative process Is
manifested in a number of subtle ways: its routine enactment of "housekeeping" reforms
proposed by the Judicial Conference, see supra note 27; its repeated pronouncements,
through key legislators, that Congress depends on information it receives from the judiciary, see supra note 278; and the symbolic gestures of placing judges ahead of other witnesses on hearing schedules, or affording them their own day of hearings, see, e.g., Federal
Courts Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice Reform Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 86-182 (1990) (federal judges
as first four witnesses); Civil Justice Reform Act Hearings, supra note 126, at 314-416 (second day of hearings dedicated exclusively to four-person panel, including three federal
judges).
277
278
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predating the judge's ascension to the bench. Nominees for federal
judgeships typically are selected by the President upon the recommendation of a senator from the nominee's home state, meaning that most
judges will have at least one acquaintance in Congress.mz To have
attracted the attention of a United States Senator, the nominee often
will have led a public life sufficiently high in its political profile to
have brought her into contact with other members of Congress as
well.

Judges can and do exploit these contacts. In his study of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Professor Christopher Smith argued
that magistrate judges were successful in their efforts to lobby for certain amendments to the Act because they joined forces with Article
III judges, who took advantage of the "political connections and personal relationships [that they] utilized in order to gain
appointment."'' 2
Professor Smith noted, however, that judges exploit their contacts
in part because other means of influence available to conventional
lobbyists are unavailable to judges. 8 3 Moreover, contacts alone may
be of increasingly questionable value. The career paths of judges and
legislators diverge more now than they have in centuries past,2 4 suggesting the possibility that mutual understanding and prior relationships may not be as strong now as before. When judges test these
increasingly attenuated relationships by taking positions on legislative
reform that appear self-interested, preexisting contacts may not be
enough to stop legislators from questioning the judges' credibility. Senior Circuit Judge Frank Coffin, reflecting back on an ultimately successful campaign to lobby Congress to increase judicial salaries,
observed that "[w]e as judges could claim almost no influence with
our lawmakers, who had sponsored us."'' w Rather, it was only after
the judges formed a coalition with the organized bar, thereby generat281 See Harold NV. Chase, Federal Judges: The Appointing Process, 51 Minn. L Rev.
185, 190 (1966) (discussing custom, originating in Washington administration, by which

"[s]enators of the President's party suggested candidates to the President for federal offices
in their home states").
282

Christopher E. Smith, Judicial Lobbying and Court Reform: U.S. Magistrate Judges

and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 14 U. Ark. Little Rock I.. 163, 196 (1992).
283 See id. at 167-70 (discussing ethical rules and federal law that prohibit judges from
using public funds to influence Congress and that place limitations on interbranch communications); see also supra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
284 See Roger H. Davidson, What Judges Ought to Know About Lawmaking in Con-

gress, in Judges and Legislators, supra note 5, at 90, 93-94 (describing absence of experiential overlap between judges and legislators and concluding that "[tjoday, the two career
paths diverge more than ever before").
285 Coffin, supra note 49, at 127.
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ing "influential, broadly representative support," that the effort prevailed. 286 Therein lies a paradox that merits elaboration.
C. The Competence-CredibilityParadoxand the Role of Prudence
as a Constrainton Judge-LegislatorInteraction
As I have just argued, judges are uniquely credible lobbyists and
uniquely competent sources of information on legislation and rules.
Accepting the core tenets of the interactive paradigm, they need to
remain actively involved in law reform. The health and well-being of
the judiciary depend on intelligent and sensitive lawmaking, which in
turn depends on lawmakers having access to information and expertise that judges alone can provide. Yet when judges impart information to legislators on matters within their sphere of competence, they
put their credibility at risk to the extent that their efforts coincide with
personal or institutional self-interest. For the conventional interest
group, overly aggressive self-interested lobbying does not necessarily
threaten the group's ability to influence Congress, for it has other
weapons at its disposal over and above its perceived competence and
credibflity.287 For the judiciary, on the other hand, which lacks these
additional weapons, 288 lost credibility translates into a lost capacity to
influence congressional decisionmaking.
In statutory reform, then, the judiciary confronts a recurrent
catch-22: to maximize the flow of competent information to Congress
in the legislative process and risk credibility loss, or to preserve credibility at the expense of competent information flow. The challenge
for the judiciary is to escape the competence-credibility paradox by
channeling its interactions with Congress in ways that enable it to
share its expertise on matters of institutional or personal self-interest
without appearing so self-interested as to compromise its credibility.
Escaping the paradox therefore imposes limits on the judiciary's extrajudicial activities, limits that are not created by the Constitution,
statutes, or codes of judicial conduct, but rather by the dictates of
prudence.
In rulemaking, we have another variation of the same problem.
The judiciary is a uniquely competent procedural rulemaker, which is
why Congress has delegated primary rulemaking authority to the judiciary. At the same time, its credibility is put at risk when it exercises
that authority. As the scope of purely "procedural" rules- politically
defined-continues to shrink, so too does the judiciary's latitude to
286 Id.
M See supra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 263-69 and accompanying text.
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make rules without interest group and ultimately congressional
second-guessing. As congressional second-guessing increases, so too
does the interested public's skepticism, thereby generating a downward spiral. The operative prudential constraint is the same here as in
the legislative process: The judiciary must avoid rulemaking activities
that appear so self-interested as to invite credibility-damaging altercations with Congress. The $64,000 question is likewise the same: How
can the judiciary respect this prudential constraint in the context of an
interactive paradigm that encourages the judiciary to lend its expertise
to the lawmaking process on matters with respect to which the judiciary has an obvious institutional interest?
The stakes are high, for the consequences of lost credibility do
not necessarily stop with frustration of the interactive paradigm. If
the prevailing view in Congress becomes that judges cannot be trusted
to take principled, public-spirited positions in the legislative process, it
is a short, logical step to say that they cannot be trusted to administer
their own affairs or to decide cases in a principled, public-spirited
manner, thereby necessitating heavy-handed oversight by the political
branches.
The concern may be more than theoretical. In January 1996, U.S.
District Judge Harold Baer granted a criminal defendant's motion to
exclude certain evidence in a drug case, on the grounds that the evidence had been seized pursuant to an unreasonable search in contravention of the Fourth Amendment. 2- The ruling attracted the
attention of then-Senate Majority leader and presidential candidate
Robert Dole, who together with Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich
called for impeachment proceedings if Judge Baer did not change his
ruling.290 A Clinton administration official, in turn, suggested that the
President would request Judge Baer's resignation if he did not reverse
himself.291 Judge Baer changed his ruling.
Even more recently, Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, citing nepotism concerns, threatened to
block the appointment of William Fletcher to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unless his mother, Judge Betty B.
Fletcher, who was also on the court, stepped aside.292 Five times previously in its history, the Senate had confirmed the appointment of
289 See John M. Goshko & Nancy Reckler, Controversial Drug Ruling is Reversed; N.Y.
Judge Now Finds Evidence Admissible, Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al.

290 See id. at A5.
291 See id. The official

later backed away from his suggestion. See id.

See Playing Games with an Old Law; Phony Issue of Nepotism Is Being Used to
Block Judgeship Nominee, L.A. Times, May 10, 1996, at B8 (editorial) [hereinafter Playing
292

Games].
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federal judges at times when a relative of the appointee already was
on the federal bench,293 but that was then, and this is now. Judge
294
Fletcher agreed to take senior status.
IV
DEVISING A STRATEGY FOR FACILITATING JUDGE-LEGISLATOR
INTERACTION WITHIN PRUDENTIAL CONSTRAINTS

I do not want to overstate my case. I do not mean to argue or
imply that Congress and the judiciary are in a state of war, or that
interbranch confrontation is becoming the norm. To the contrary, the
judiciary continues to pursue peaceful and productive interaction with
Congress most of the time, consistent with the new, interactive paradigm. 295 My concern is that credibility-damaging confrontations between the first and third branches of government-while not the
norm-are nevertheless on the rise, and that if this trend is left unchecked, it could do serious long-term damage to the judiciary's institutional integrity.
In the final Part of this Article, I will first explore the mechanisms
that the judiciary has used in the past to avoid damaging interbranch
confrontation and seek to explain why confrontations persist despite
the existence of conflict-avoidance mechanisms. Aided by a review of
proposals offered by others, I will then offer a multipart reform
proposal.
A.
1.

Conflict-Avoidance Mechanisms and Their Limits

Consensus, Compromise, and Acquiescence

A deceptively simple solution to the competence-credibility paradox is for the judiciary to pursue a strict policy of consensus and compromise building in its lobbying and rulemaking strategies, a policy
that studiously avoids high-profile, credibility-damaging confrontations with Congress. In the past, when nobody outside of the judiciary
could muster the energy to care very much about court administration
and procedure, it was comparatively easy for the judiciary to promulgate procedural rules without interference and to secure statutory re293 See id.; see also Claudia MacLachlan, Hatch Pressures Judge to Take Senior Status,
Nat'l L.i., May 20, 1996, at A14.
294 See Playing Games, supra note 292, at B8; MacLachlan, supra note 293, at A14. One
could dismiss the Baer and Fletcher episodes as more a matter of election-year politics
than a reflection of Congress's lack of confidence in the judiciary. Even so, the very fact
that the political branches have deemed the judiciary a suitable football in their quadrennial games is a telling indicator of the judiciary's increasing vulnerability.
295 See infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
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forms from a largely indifferent Congress by means of low-profile
consensus building.
The judiciary has not abandoned its policy of consensus building.
It continues to pursue such a policy successfully with respect to most
statutory reforms it seeks.296 It has done so through a variety of
means. Judges have exploited opportunities for informal interaction
with legislators-such as Brookings Institution or Federal Judicial
Center conferences-where disagreements can be resolved amicably
in less political settings.297 The Judicial Conference has initiated reforms at the suggestion of congressional leaders without waiting for
statutory directives, thereby promoting a spirit of cooperation and
possibly obviating more draconian, legislated alternatives that the judiciary might have to oppose.M It has picked its battles with care,
acquiescing on matters of lesser concern and taking positions in opposition to congressional leaders only when its views are strongly held.m
296 A dramatic illustration of the judiciary's continuing ability to achieve results through
cooperative interaction is the recent enactment of a separate budget for the federal judiciary, which enabled the judiciary to avoid the shutdown that affected the rest of the federal
government during the 1995-1996 budget impasse. See Act of Jan. 6, 1996, Pub. L No. 10491, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 7, 10-14. Administrative Office Director L Ralph
Mecham credited "[m]embers of Congress, leaders in the Judiciary and AO staff," who
"joined forces to achieve what at one time appeared to be an unattainable goal." Judiciary
Secures FY 96 Funding, The Third Branch (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts), Jan. 1996, at
1, 10.
297 See Cannon & Cikins, supra note 49, at 9-10 (discussing role of Brookings Conference in development of Omnibus Judgeship Act).
298 See, e.g., supra note 126 and accompanying text; infra note 311 and accompanying
text; see also Geyh, supra note 140, at 1053 n.97 (discussing Judicial Conference's proposal
to create 14-point case-management plan in unsuccessful effort to dissuade Congress from
enacting Civil Justice Reform Act).
299 For example, Administrative Office Director L. Ralph Mecham recently sent Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch a letter communicating the Judicial Conference's position on the "Stop Turning Out Prisoners" Act. The Conference opposed only
one subsection that limited magistrate-judge authority in prison condition cases. It "expresse[d] no view on the merits of other provisions," despite obvious reservations about
other sections that implicated "federalism concerns," raised "basic questions about the
Constitution's separation of powers," and "affect[ed] procedures covered by [the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure] without resort to the processes contemplated by the Rules Enabling Act." Letter from L. Ralph Mecham, Secretary, Judicial Conference of the United
States, to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary 2-3 (May25,
1995) (on file with author). Even though legislative efforts to bypass the Rules Enabling
Act had been actively opposed by the Judicial Conference in the past (as was the case with
the Civil Justice Reform Act), here the judiciary limited its formal opposition, thereby
preserving a spirit of cooperation and increasing the likelihood that the judiciary's most
pressing problem would not be ignored. Compare this conciliatory approach with a more
direct and combative approach taken by the Judicial Conference during an earlier controversy. See Civil Justice Reform Act Hearings, supra note 126, at 334 (testimony of Judge
Robert F. Peckham, Chairman, Judicial Conference of the United States Subcommittee on
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990) ("[O]ne of the primary bases for our opposition to
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It also has sought to improve the quality and reliability of the information and recommendations it has communicated to Congress (thereby
reducing the need for congressional second-guessing) through such innovations as the Office of Judicial Impact Assessment. 300
In the rulemaking arena, the judiciary has likewise pursued a policy of conflict avoidance. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes the rules applicable to "all suits of a civil nature," and
articulates the aspiration that the rules be construed "to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."'30 ' As
Professor Carrington has argued, for a transsubstantive set of rules to
achieve the universal goals set out in Rule 1, such rules must remain
neutral, which requires that rulemaking "avoid the interest group politics that is the meat and drink of the parliaments of the world.''302 The
Judicial Conference traditionally has averted confrontations with Congress, Professor Carrington continues, by promulgating rules general
enough and flexible enough to win widespread approval and avoid
piquing legislative interest. 3 When, as in the case of Civil Rule 68
reform, specific interest groups have complained that a proposed role
will affect them disproportionately, the rulemakers have abandoned
the project.3 0 4
One could rightly argue that the more recent brouhaha over the
discovery rules, in which the judiciary rammed mandatory disclosure
down the throat of an unwilling bar without waiting to obtain empirical support for the reform, reflects a different, almost conflict-seeking
approach to rulemaking. 305 But the Civil Rules Committee has shown
signs of learning from that episode in the case of Rule 23 reform,
where the Committee has committed the rule to further study pending
more extensive consultation with the practicing bar. 30 6
Notwithstanding the judiciary's continuing efforts to promote interbranch communication and minimize credibility-damaging confronthe statute is our belief that nationally applicable procedural norms should be imposed
only through that rule-making process.").
300 For a discussion of the OJIA's establishment, see infra notes 315-41 and accompanying text.
301 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
302 Carrington, supra note 85, at 2078.
303 See id. at 2078-85 (arguing that goal of political neutrality requires rules to be driven
by need for generalism and flexibility).
304 See id. at 2078-79 (noting that complaints by civil rights bar led rulemakers to abandon attempt to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68).
305 See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
306 See Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure and Power, Address at the AALS Concurrent

Session on Civil Procedure 4-5 (Jan. 4, 1996) (transcript on file with author) (exploring
history of power struggles between judiciary, legislature, and practitioners in arena of civil
procedure).
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tations with Congress, the problem is that the opportunities for
consensus and compromise have contracted as the pressure for Congress to make impositions on the third branch has expanded. This has
proved to be true in both the statutory and rule reform arenas.
With respect to statutory reform, the political branches have responded to pressure to address such issues as crime, civil rights, civil
case management, and the budget by increasing the federal judiciary's
workload, decreasing its discretionary power, and scrutinizing the judiciary's pay, perquisites, and operating expenses more closely.30 7
Unable to forge a consensus or compromise, the judiciary has responded by criticizing and sometimes opposing congressional action,
buoyed by a core tenet of the interactive paradigm that interbranch
communication of this sort is appropriate and desirable. The net effect, as documented in Part I, has been an occasional movement
away from the politics of consensus and toward the politics of confrontation that has engendered congressional skepticism and precipitated a number of attacks on the judiciary's credibility.3 03
With respect to rulemaking, there has been a variation on the
same theme, as increasingly skeptical interest groups have solicited
Congress to challenge the judiciary's rulemaking monopoly on a more
and more regular basis, once again pitting Congress against the judiciary in a series of comparatively high-profile confrontations. o To
avoid confrontations, the judiciary has pursued equally problematic
alternatives, acquiescing in precipitous congressional rule reform 310 or
engaging in precipitous rule reform of its own in an effort to stave off
congressional interference and confrontation.31 '
2. Buffering Devices
On a number of occasions in which the judiciary has been unable
to achieve consensus or compromise, and acquiescence would disserve
the goals of the interactive paradigm, the judiciary has managed to
avoid direct confrontations with Congress on controversial subjects by
routing its communications through others. To the extent that organizations such as the American Bar Association share the judiciary's
perspective on a particular piece of legislation, e.g., a judicial pay
307 See supra notes 50, 220-22, 231-34 and accompanying text.

308 See supra notes 209-40 and accompanying text.

309 See supra notes 241-47 and accompanying text.

310 See supra note 299.

311 See, e.g., 23 Wright & Graham, supra note 128, § 5381.1 (Supp. 1996) (describing
Judicial Conference's promulgation of Federal Rule of Evidence 412 as "preemptive strike

against more radical reform" by Congress, in which "[h]aste was necessary .. to beat
Congress to the punch").
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raise, it has been possible for the judiciary to insulate itself by joining
forces and reducing the need to assume a high-profile, leadership role
312
on the issue.
Federal judges have also buffered their recommendations to Congress through independent commissions. 3 13 The recommendations
that have emerged from these commissions are those of the commissions and not their member judges, despite the fact that the judges
have, in many instances, authored the recommendations. In such instances, the recommendations represent the collected wisdom of an
independent, public-spirited commission, rather than the work product of arguably self-interested judges. 314 The net effect is that the proposals of the commission are presented to Congress with an aura of
credibility that assists in their adoption, while any public and congressional criticism of the proposals is deflected away from the judges who
authored them and toward the commission that issued them.
In some cases, there will be no readily available intermediary
through which the judiciary may buffer its communications to Congress. In the rulemaking context, the judiciary has a statutorily assigned leadership role-there are no intermediaries. In the case of
statutory reform, other lobbyists may be unsuitable intermediaries insofar as their positions differ from the judiciary's. Independent commissions may not exist when intermediaries are needed. Occasionally,
there may be insufficient time to communicate indirectly.
The judiciary also may bypass an available intermediary and communicate with Congress directly on controversial issues despite the
risk of a credibility-damaging confrontation because the judiciary does
not want to lose control over how information is gathered, what information is communicated to Congress, and how that information is
312 See supra note 285 and accompanying text (discussing role of ABA in securing congressional approval of judicial pay raise); see also Katzmann, supra note 51. at 165
("Judges, asserted [former ABA president Chesterfield] Smith, should filter their views
through the ABA and let that organization, 'as a voice of officers of the court,' present
proposals that are in the interest of the administration of justice. In other words, the ABA
would serve as a surrogate for the judiciary.").
At the same time, to the extent that the judiciary affiliates itself with an outside organization, there is the risk that the positions of the organization will be attributed to the
judiciary. For this reason the ABA, for example, has sought to define the appropriate
limits of judges' participation in its affairs. See generally O'Scannlain, supra note 167 (reviewing ABA's attempts to define limits of judicial participation).
313 See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
314 This is true at least when the judge's participation on the commission is not unusually
visible. Former judge Abner Mikva, for example, distinguished between judicial participation on commissions charged with making recommendations for the administration of justice, which he regarded as helpful, and "'high-profile, highly visible commissions,' such as

the Warren Commission," about which he had misgivings. Katzmann, supra note 51, at
166.
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transmitted. The debate between judges and legislators within the
Federal Courts Study Committee over who should control the judicial
impact assessment function-the courts or Congress-illustrates
nicely the reluctance of the judiciary to relinquish control to an intermediary of the information Congress receives concerning the courts,
even if that means risking the possibility that the information Congress receives directly from the judiciary will be discredited as the
work product of a self-interested source.
At the first meeting of the Federal Courts Study Committee on
February 3, 1989, Study Committee Chairman, Circuit Judge Joseph
Weis, Jr., created a Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal Courts
in Relation to State Courts, chaired by Judge Richard Posner, to examine, among other subjects, "the partnership with Congress." 315 By
July, the Posner Subcommittee had developed a proposal, which was
explained in a memorandum prepared by Subcommittee reporter Professor Larry Kramer: "We recommend that Congress create an
agency to engage in ongoing review of the use of federal judicial resources," called the "Office of Judicial Impact Assessment"
(OJIA) 3 16 Recognizing that "success depends on how the agency is
organized," the Subcommittee recommended that the OJIA be "an
independent support agency within the legislature, like the Congres317
sional Research Service," with a staff removable only for cause.
Among the OJIA's possible tasks would be "to predict what kinds of
'318
cases are likely to arise under particular legislation.
At the July 31, 1989, meeting of the Study Committee, the federal
judges who were members of the Study Committee (other than Judge
Posner) reacted cautiously to the proposed creation of the OJIA.
"[W]hy is it in the legislative branch rather than the judicial
branch[?]" inquired District Judge Jose Cabranes.3 19 "I suspect that
some members of the judicial branch might wonder whether it
wouldn't be, in a sense, too independent of judicial perspective or judicial interest or concern. ' 320 Senior Circuit Judge Levin Campbell
echoed the same concern:
I [am] worried a little bit about whether an agency that was put in
the legislative branch exclusively with tenured officials would, at
315 Transcript of Proceedings of the Federal Courts Study Committee 32 (Feb. 3, 1989)
(on file with author).
316 Memorandum from Larry Kramer to Members of the Federal Courts Study Committee 5 (July 21, 1989) (on file with author).
317 Id. at 7.
318 Id. at 6.
319 Transcript of Proceedings of the Federal Courts Study Committee 74 (July 31, 1989)
(on file with author).
320 Id.
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some point, assert itself in a way to not intimidate the judiciary but
to start getting a particular point of view expressed to the judiciary.
Of course, the legislative branch is very powerful. It can be because
they have what we need-money and resources-and there is always the possibility that people in an agency of that sort would develop a sense that they sort of ought to be running the show a little
32
bit. 1

The concerns of Judges Campbell and Cabranes underscore the
judiciary's reluctance to buffer its communications through an intermediary because of the lost control it would entail. In their minds, an
entity divorced from the judiciary would be insufficiently attuned to
the needs of the third branch to assess judicial impact effectively and
could develop other agendas that might interfere with accurate, goodfaith impact forecasting.
On the other hand, the advantage of locating the OJIA in the
legislative branch would be to create, in the minds of legislators, a
more credible information source. Senator Charles Grassley, a member of the Study Committee, underscored the point at the July 31,
1989, Study Committee meeting:
[T]he power of the Congressional Budget Office just on appropriation is a leading indicator of an impact that an agency of Congress
can have ....
And if you were thinking in terms of something that would
force that sort of consideration
on the part of Congress it could
3 22
make a real difference.
Asked, "What would be a meaningful kind of [judicial impact] statement to you?" Senator Grassley sounded the credibility theme explicitly: "I don't know whether it is the statement, itself, but it is respect
for the statement," he replied, respect like that accorded the reports
of such congressional agencies as the General Accounting Office or
323
the Congressional Budget Office.
At the October 29 and 30, 1989, meeting of the Study Committee,
when a vote on the proposal was scheduled, Robert Feidler, the Legislative and Public Affairs Officer for the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts and judicial liaison to the Study Committee, circulated to Study Committee members a memorandum he had prepared for Administrative Office Director L. Ralph Mecham. 324 The
Id. at 76-77.
Id. at 81.
323 Id. at 86-87.
324 See Memorandum from Robert E. Feidler, Legislative and Public Affairs Officer,
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, to L. Ralph Mecham, Director, Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts 1 (Oct. 30, 1989) [hereinafter Feidler Memorandum] (on file with
author) (arguing that placement of support agency such as OJIA within legislative branch
321
322
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memo stressed the relative competence of the judiciary to assess judicial impact: "All of the objectives [of the proposed OJIA] are now
being done by the [Judicial] Conference," Feidler wrote. 325 "When
Congress asks for an impact statement... the [Administrative Office]
has responded in a timely and thoughtful manner." 26 Feidler noted:
"There is simply no reason to believe that an agency created within
the Legislative Branch would be better capable of advising the Members than is the Judicial Branch directly. 327 Of primary concern to
Feidler, however, was that if the judiciary's data were filtered through
a congressional OJIA, the judiciary would lose control over the
process:
To place these functions in the Legislative Branch in a support
agency as envisioned by the subcommittee would eviscerate the role
of the Judicial Conference in the legislative process.
. ..To create a specific body within the Legislative Branch to
perform these functions would make the Judiciary non-players in
many major decisions affecting the Judiciary.328
In the vote that followed, the Committee "[r]ecommended in
substance that Congress create an agency to enhance inter-branch
communications." 329 The recommendation to locate the agency in
Congress ultimately was defeated; in its place, the Committee approved a recommendation that the agency be within the "Judicial
Branch., 330
While the Study Committee evidently was satisfied that the task
of assessing judicial impact was one that should remain in the competent hands of the third branch, the possibility that the judiciary would
appear self-interested and that its impact assessments therefore could
lack credibility with Congress remained a concern. On the basis of a
report of the Study Committee Subcommittee on Administration,
Management and Structure,331 a November 27, 1989, tentative draft of
the Study Committee refined its recommendation by proposing that
would eviscerate role of Judicial Conference). This memorandum was, in effect, submitted
in response to a request from Chairman Weis that Mr. Feidler "give us your ideas." Transcript of Proceedings of the Federal Courts Study Committee 88 (July 31, 1989) (on file
with author).
325 Feidler Memorandum, supra note 324, at 1.
326 Id. at 2.
327 Id. at 1.
328 Id.
329 Draft Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Federal Courts Study Committee, October
29 & 30, 1989, at 6 (Nov. 2, 1989) (on file with author).
330 Id.
331 Report of the Subcommittee on Structure to the Federal Courts Study Committee
28-29 (Nov. 15, 1989) (on file with author) (recommending creation of OA in Federal
Judicial Center).
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the OJIA be located in the Federal Judicial Center specifically, rather
than in the judicial branch generally.332 Although impact forecasting
previously had been undertaken by the Administrative Office, the tentative draft explained that "[t]he advantage of placing this office in the
Center is that it would be separate from operational entities and thus
would be more likely to be perceived as being an objective agency
rather than an advocacy agency. ' 333 To that end, "[t]he office would
not endorse or condemn legislation. It would confine itself to an analysis of the impact of the legislation. '334
The refinement of the tentative draft was approved by the Study
Committee on December 10, 1989. A subsequent draft, dated December 22, 1989, was disseminated for public comment, with a reference
to the Federal Judicial Center as "an objective agency rather than an
advocacy agency" deleted.335 Not surprisingly, the committee of the
Judicial Conference that oversees the Administrative Office objected
to locating the OJIA in the Federal Judicial Center: "The Committee
on the Administrative Office [of the Judicial Conference]... does not
support the recommendation to create an Office of Judicial Impact
Assessment in the Federal Judicial Center," wrote Conference Committee Chairman and Circuit Judge Harlington Wood, Jr., to the Federal Courts Study Committee.3 36 "We believe this responsibility
should remain under the direction of the Judicial Conference. Impact
assessments are currently being made for the Conference by the Administrative Office which has firsthand familiarity with these
matters." 337
In the end, the Judicial Conference prevailed. On February 15,
1990, the Committee voted to substitute "the judicial branch" for the
Federal Judicial Center, which is how the recommendation was
332 See Federal Courts Study Comm., Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee,
Tentative Draft No. 1, at 86-87 (Nov. 27, 1989) [hereinafter Draft No. 1] (on file with
author) (submitted to Federal Courts Study Committee for discussion at meetings held on
December 10 and 11, 1989). Because of the closeness of the October 30 vote, and the
absence of four members, the Posner Subcommittee proposal was included in the tentative
draft as a second option. See id. at 87-89. The second option was rejected at the December 10, 1989, meeting. See Federal Courts Study Committee, Draft Agenda, at 2 (Dec. 1011, 1989) (on file with author) (noting approval of proposal "with elimination of option

2").
333 Draft No. 1, supra note 332, at 86-87.
334 Id. at 87.
335 See Federal Courts Study Comm., Tentative Recommendations for Public Comment
126-27 (Dec. 22, 1989) (on file with author).

336 Letter from Harlington Wood, Jr., Chairman, Committee of the Judicial Conference,

to Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chairman, Federal Courts Study Committee 1 (Jan. 9, 1990) (on file
with author).
337 Id.
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phrased when the Committee report was issued in April.3 3 Five of
the Committee's fifteen members dissented, arguing that the Commit39
tee should have recommended locating an OJIA in Congress?
The final draft of the Posner Subcommittee report, issued after
the full Committee had concluded its OJIA deliberations, persisted in
its support for a congressional OJIA, arguing that "precisely because
[the Administrative Office is] not part of Congress, [it has] only a limited ability to demand attention and [is] often treated more like [a]
lobb[y] than [a] helpmate[ ]."340 The prescience of the Subcommittee's conclusion is borne out by the subsequent altercations between
Congress and the judiciary, discussed earlier, in which skeptical legislators have rejected the judiciary's caseload and impact assessments as
exaggerated and self-interested. 341
B. Proposalsfor Reform
So, here we are. We have a new way of thinking about the relationship between courts and Congress in statutory reform and
rulemaking that eschews separation in favor of interaction between
judges and legislators. Moreover, I have argued there are no meaningful constitutional, statutory, or ethical constraints upon judge-legislator interaction in this new paradigm. Although such constraints
exist, they are significantly less confining than prudential constraints,
key among which is that the judiciary communicate with Congress in
ways that minimize the risk of credibility-damaging confrontations
that have proliferated in recent years. By pursuing reform through
consensus and compromise, and communicating policy positions to
Congress through intermediaries when consensus and compromise are
impossible, the judiciary has (for the most part) interacted within prudential constraints. More recently, however, external pressures on the
two branches have occasionally caused the judiciary to bypass conflictavoidance devices, exceed prudential constraints, and assume a more
confrontational posture with Congress. The question that remains is
338 Study Committee Report, supra note 62, at 89.
339 The five were Representative Robert Kasteneier, former Solicitor General Rex
Lee, Judge Judith Keep, Representative Carlos Moorhead, and Judge Richard Posner. Because a number of Committee members chose not to draft or sign on to dissents from
recommendations they opposed in the Committee, it is probably not safe to assume that
the final vote on the proposal was 10 to 5. See id. at 92-93.
340 Report to the Federal Courts Study Committee on the Role of the Federal Courts
and Their Relation to the States, in 1 Federal Courts Study Committee Working Papers

and Subcommittee Reports 1,138 (1990). For a powerful argument in support of the Subcommittee's proposal, see Kramer, supra note 48, at 94-97 (arguing that locating agency in
Congress would enhance its credibility and influence).
341 See supra Part III.A.
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what more, if anything, can be done to avert such confrontations in
the future so as to preserve the judiciary's influential extrajudicial role
and its institutional integrity.
Others have proposed some innovative solutions to the problems
afflicting the judiciary in its extrajudicial role. The difficulty with such
proposals has been their tendency to define "the problem" too narrowly. Individual commentators have focussed on varied concerns:
the amount of communication between judges and legislators; a42 the
level of congressional and judicial interference in procedural rulemaking;343 the movement away from transsubstantive procedural lawmaking;344 and the balkanization of the national system of procedural
rules on a district-by-district basis.3 45 These commentators have, in
effect, addressed the problems of the elephant in terms of its trunk, its
tail, or its leg, without putting together a picture of the animal as a
whole. What I have tried to do in this Article is to provide a wideangle view of the entire pachyderm. Aided by that view, it becomes
possible to reassess the merits of the proposals offered to date, to accept parts or all of some, and to amplify others, to the end of developing a more complete package of reforms.
1. Statutory Reform Proposals
I propose the creation of a permanent, independent, fifteenmember Interbranch Commission on Law Reform and the Judiciary,
to be comprised of representatives from all three branches of government, litigation user groups, and academia. The Interbranch Commission would develop court reform recommendations for Congress on
an ongoing basis and evaluate legislative proposals affecting the courts
introduced by members of Congress. 346 To preserve the Commission's independence, each of the three branches would appoint an
equal number of commissioners. The implementing legislation could
342 See Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 20, at 31 (discussing historical lack of communication between federal judiciary and Congress); see also supra note 6.
343 See Burbank, supra note 9, at 842 (seeking rulemaking moratorium); Walker, supra
note 9, at 574-82 (arguing that rules ordinarily should not be promulgated without empirical foundation); see also supra note 7.
344 See Marcus, supra note 4, at 778-79 (explaining movement toward more subjectmatter specific procedural rules).
345 See Tobias, supra note 10, at 1402-03 (arguing that Civil Justice Reform Act, by requiring district courts to develop their own case-management procedures, has balkanized
procedural reform).
346 The assumption here is that members of Congress would remain free to develop and

introduce proposals on their own, independent of the Commission; moreover, even when a
proposal is developed by the Commission it may be redrafted by legislative counsel or

members of Congress before or after a bill is introduced, therefore necessitating better
Commission evaluation.
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be modeled after that establishing the National Commission on Judicial Discipline & Removal (NCJDR) 47 The President and the Chief
Justice would each appoint four commissioners for staggered, multiyear terms, and the Speaker of the House and President Pro Tempore
of the Senate would each appoint two (one from each political party).
I would, however, propose two deviations from the NCJDR model:
First, I would include in the enabling legislation a directive that the
appointing authorities make their selections with an eye toward ensuring that the Commission represent a spectrum of perspectives on the
administration of justice. With each appointing authority limited to
four selections, it is quite likely that the Commission would inadvertently exclude essential points of view in the absence of such a direcfive. The NCJDR, for example, initially included no women on the
Perhaps as a consequence, the Comtwelve-member Commission
mission did not address in earnest the issue of gender bias as the subject of judicial discipline until after the issue was called to its attention
by hearing witnesses-female witnesses.3 9 Second, I suggest that the
twelve commissioners, after being selected by the branch leaders,
choose three additional commissioners from the ranks of litigation
user groups and academia. Although it would be simpler for the latter
three commissioners to be selected, one each, by the branch leaders
themselves, assigning the task to the remainder of the Commission
would facilitate the selection of a more representative group by reducing the risk that the branch leaders might randomly appoint representatives from the same or substantially similar user groups.
Over the course of the past century, various judges, legislators,
and commissions have proposed the creation of an entity to monitor
and recommend legislative proposals affecting the courts. 350 They
347 See National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal Act, Pub. L No. 101650, §§ 408-418, 104 Stat. 5089,5124-27 (1990), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 372 Historical and
Statutory Notes (1994).
348 See Commission Masthead, Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline (Aug. 1993) (naming commissioners and dates of service).
349 See Hearings of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal 411-80
(Jan. 29, 1993) (testimony of Justice Elizabeth Lacy, Barbara Saffret, and Judith Resnik).

The Commission subsequently assigned Assistant Director Michael Straight to prepare a
consultant's report on gender. See Michael Straight, Accountability for Racial, Religious,
Ethnic and Gender Bias Misconduct and Sexual Harassment by Federal Judges, in 2 Re-

search Papers of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, supra note
42, at 1679.
35D Proposals for creation of an office charged with reviewing lavs andlor court deci-

sions and recommending revisions include: Committee on Long Range Planning, Judicial
Conference of the U.S., Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 118 (1995)

(proposing creation of National Commission on the Federal Courts); Benjamin N.
Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 123-26 (1921) (proposing creation of
ministry of justice to review and recommend revisions to laws passed); William E. Cooper,
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have argued that an independent office or agency of this sort is
needed to ensure that court reform is systematic, to minimize statutory errors and oversights, to better inform Congress as to the impact
of its proposals on the courts, and to improve interbranch cooperation.351 The time has come to revisit such a proposal in pursuit of a
fundamentally different and far more ambitious goal: to redefine and
restructure the process by which legislation affecting the judiciary is
developed for the purpose of accommodating the needs and avoiding
the pitfalls of the new, interactive paradigm.
In the short term, the Interbranch Commission would help to preserve the judiciary's influential role as a competent, credible advisor in
statutory development. The judiciary's influence upon the recommendations of the Interbranch Commission would be considerable. Because the Commission's task would be to develop and monitor
legislation affecting the judiciary, it is a fair assumption that the commissioners most familiar with the inner workings of the judiciary,
namely the judges, would be paid considerable heed by the Commission as a whole. Such was the case with the tri-branch Federal Courts
Study Committee, as evidenced by the successful efforts of the judges
352
on the Committee to redirect the OJIA proposal.
The influence of Interbranch Commission recommendations on
Congress is also likely to be considerable. In the past, Congress has
created and deferred to the judgment of administrative agencies and
other independent entities when it has lacked the time, competence,
or political will to make appropriate judgments independently. 353 In
A Proposal for a Congressional Council of Revision, 12 Seton Hall Legis. J. 233, 238-40
(1989) (proposing council of revision comprised of former judges and legislators); Friendly,
supra note 48, at 802-07 (proposing creation of committee for legislative development of
laws, equivalent to ministry of justice); Ginsburg, supra note 48, 1011-17 (1987) (proposing
that "second look at laws" committee be established within each house of Congress);
Kramer. supra note 48, at 95 (advocating establishment of planning agency within legislative branch).
351 See sources cited supra note 350.
352 See supra notes 315-41 and accompanying text.
353 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & William T. Mayton, Administrative Law 40 (1993) (noting that raison d'etre for administrative agency rulemaking is to fill statutory gaps that
Congress lacks time or competence to fill on its own). More recently, Congress created an
independent entity for a different purpose-to make hard choices that Congress could not.
The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act created
a commission to recommend which military bases should be closed and limited Congress to
accepting all or none of the commission's recommendations, so as to prevent Congress

from letting the politics of local constituent pressure control the decisionmaking process.
See Pub. L. No. 100-526, §§ 201-203, 102 Stat. 2623, 2627 (1988) (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. § 2687 (1994)); see also Don't Close Down Base Closings, Wash. Post, Mar. 7, 1994,
at A18 (editorial) (describing Base Closure and Realignment Act as "ingenious" means by
which Congress could "save itself from itself").
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the case of an entity that includes members of Congress, the level of
congressional deference may be even greater. The fifteen-member
Federal Courts Study Committee, for example, included four members of Congress. The extent of congressional deference to the Study
Committee's recommendations is reflected in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, which implemented seventeen Study Committee
recommendations less than a year after the Study Committee issued
its final report.3M By buffering its communications to Congress
through the Interbranch Commission, then, the judiciary's contribution to and influence over statutory reform would be preserved.
At the same time, the Interbranch Commission would maximize
opportunities for consensus lawmaking and minimize interbranch confrontation. Small group dynamics suggest that the proposed Commission would seek to avoid conflict and develop recommendations by
consensus, compromise, and acquiescence whenever possible,355 If
consensus on a given proposal is achieved within the Commission,
odds are good that it will translate into consensus legislation, because
even though the Commission would be comprised of small subsets of
the three branches, that number, if carefully selected, would be sufficient to influence, if not speak for, the three branches in most
instances. 356
354 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-650, §§ 302-318, 104 Stat.
5104 (codified in scattered sections of 5,11,18,28 U.S.C.). Of these 17 sections, all but the
four relating to bankruptcy reform were discussed in the House Judiciary Committee Report with explicit reference to the corresponding Study Committee recommendations. See
H.R. Rep. No. 734, 101st ong., 2d Sess. 17-30 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6860,6862-78. The four bankruptcy reform sections, which were not a part of the bill at the
time the House Report was written, were nevertheless Study Committee recommendations. See Draft No. 1, supra note 332, at 75-78 (describing bankruptcy reform
recommendations).
355 See generally A. Paul Hare, Small Group Research: A Handbook (1994) (reviewing
studies involving interactions in small groups or having special relevance for small group
processes).
356 In Congress, only eight legislators have an ongoing, institutional interest in court
reform legislation: the four chairs of the House and Senate judiciary committees and their
respective subcommittees on courts, and the four ranking minority members of those committees and subcommittees. Granted, these eight cannot represent the views of Congress
as an institution, but for most purposes they are the only ones sufficiently interested in
court reform to do so. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Complex-Litigation Reform and the
Legislative Process, 10 Rev. Litig. 401, 403-04 (1991) (discussing lack of congressional interest in complex litigation reform outside and, to lesser extent, within inner circle of legis.
lators with committee jurisdiction over such matters). The judiciary, in contrast, can speak
in a single voice through the Judicial Conference, and therefore could be adequately represented on the Commission by a sole designee. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying
text. To insure parity, however, the number of third branch representatives should equal
those of the first. The executive branch likewise speaks through a single voice and therefore could be represented by only one designee, although again, as a coequal branch of
government it should have an equal role on the Commission.
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Contentious recommendations within the Commission, on the
other hand, would foreshadow a contentious legislative process to follow. Even then, however, it would be the recommendation of an
independent commission, rather than an apparently self-interested judiciary at the center of the controversy-meaning that the judiciary
could communicate its concerns on a divisive issue without risking its
credibility. Moreover, by endorsing (or opposing) judiciary-supported
reforms, the Commission could help to placate skeptics seeking
independent validation of the judiciary's proposals.
In the long term, the benefits could be even more significant. As
critical as the separation of powers may be to avoiding overconcentrations of might in a single branch, too much separation begets unfamiliarity. Unfamiliarity, in turn, begets mistrust, mistrust that could give
way to debilitating hostility in an era in which the public is predisposed to suspect the worst of its government. The Interbranch Commission represents a first step down a different path. Without
disturbing the essential separation provided for in the Constitution,
the Commission would institutionalize a new avenue for intragovemmental cooperation. If successful in the limited context of court reform, the Interbranch Commission conceivably could serve as a model
for other commissions assigned tasks in other substantive areas of law
reform.
The Interbranch Commission on Law Reform and the Judiciary
would coincide nicely with reform proposals offered by others in the
field, sidestepping their weaknesses and accentuating their strengths.
Professor Katzmann, Judge Deanell Tacha, and Judge Frank Coffin,
among others, have emphasized the need to further improve interbranch communication as a means to reduce friction between the first
and third branches and to enhance the quality of legislation affecting
the courts. 357 Consistent with Part II of this Article, they acknowledge that such communication must take place within constitutional,
statutory, and ethical limits, but they question whether such limits
stand in the way of more meaningful interaction. The views of this
group have helped to catalyze a paradigmatic shift in our understanding of the judiciary's appropriate extrajudicial lawmaking role. Their
continuing efforts to develop the infrastructure of the new paradigm
by expanding and streamlining channels of interbranch communication will assist in acclimating the judiciary to its interactive role, provided that the judiciary respects prudential constraints.

357

See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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If these authors are to be faulted, it is for failing to appreciate the

impact of their own efforts.3 58 Continued uncertainty as to the appropriate limits of judge-legislator interaction undoubtedly hampers interbranch exchanges of information to some extent.3 5 9 Nevertheless,
interbranch interaction has become so much the norm that key members of Congress and their staffs (at least those whose committee jurisdiction affects the judiciary) routinely expect it, welcome it, and do
not regard the flow of information they receive from the judiciary as
3 60
deficient

As argued in Part III, the problem for the future is not that
judges will fail to communicate with Congress. The problem is that
they may communicate too much or in such a way as to appear selfinterested to a Congress and public predisposed to second-guess the
motives of government officials in the aftermath of Watergate,
thereby fueling the arguments of Professor Christopher Smith and
others that the judiciary should no longer be trusted as a legislative
advisor.

361

Professor Smith's proposal, that Congress rely more heavily on
the views of other participants in the legislative process, parallels re358 In a recent article, Judge Tacha acknowledges that "much progress has been made"
toward opening channels of communication between judges and legislators in the past decade but warns that "nurturing of this ever-changing relationship requires vigilance."
Deanell Reece Tacha, Judges and Legislators: Enhancing the Relationship, 44 Am. U. L
Rev. 1537, 1551 (1995).
359 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
360 See A. Fletcher Mangum, Federal Judicial Ctr., Conference on Assessing the Effects
of Legislation on the Workload of the Courts 27 (1995) (quoting Circuit Judge Randall
Rader, former chief minority counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee
on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, as saying "[t]here is not a grievous communication
gap between the branches"); Biden Speaks on Agenda for Federal Courts, The Third
Branch (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts), May 1993, at 1, 1-2 (quoting Senate Judiciary
Committee Chairman Joseph Biden as saying- "[m]y job is to provide you with all the
resources you need in order to do the job that we can conclude on a principled basis must
be done .... Your job.., is to help us decide and give us your input on what those
principles are that should guide us"); Hollings Discusses Appropriations Work, The Third
Branch (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts), Feb. 1994, at 1, 10 (quoting Senator Ernest
Hollings, Chairman of Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies, as answering question "Do you
and your subcommittee have sufficient communications from the judicial branch?" by saying, "[a]bsolutely. Members of our subcommittee certainly receive many contacts and
communications from judges.... We value these discussions. We do not operate in a
vacuum."); Senator Grassley Discusses Agenda, The Third Branch (Admin. Office of the
U.S. Courts), Sept. 1995, at 1, 11 (quoting Senator Charles Grassley, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts as
saying that "mutual communication is a necessity," that he had "a responsibility to seek
out information and answers from members of the Judiciary," and that "judges have a
responsibility to come to Congress with their input on issues affecting the Judiciary"); see
also supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
361 See supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
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cent efforts to enhance public confidence in the rulemaking process by
increasing nonjudge membership on rules committees and opening
committee meetings to the pubic.3 62 While there is nothing objectionable about increasing opportunities for interested organizations to
participate in the legislative process, Professor Smith's suggestion that
Congress discontinue its longstanding deference to Judicial Conference positions on statutory reform is less a solution than a manifestation of the problem. The interactive paradigm is born of the view that
it is proper for the judiciary to influence the course of statutory reform, now more than ever, as Congress responds to escalating demands for legislative fixes to social problems by creating new causes
of action in the federal courts. The judiciary will remain an influential
voice in statutory reform, however, only as long as it possesses a reputation for competence and credibility that engenders congressional
trust and deference. If Professor Smith's recommendation is followed
and the judiciary is stripped of that reputation, it would deprive the
judiciary of its principal lobbying asset and thereby diminish dramatically the significance of the judiciary's role in statutory reform relative
to other lobbyists who can exploit the constituent and financial resources the judiciary lacks.
If one accepts the essential tenets of the interactive paradigm, the
business of reform logically begins not by attacking the credibility of
the judiciary but by protecting it. The judiciary's credibility is put on
the chopping block whenever it is forced into a high-proffile confrontation with Congress over an issue with respect to which the judiciary's
position is consistent with its institutional self-interest. Various
conflict-avoidance mechanisms have averted such confrontations on
an ad hoc basis, and that may have been sufficient when interbranch
interaction was itself ad hoc. But as interbranch interaction has become an institutional norm, the opportunities for confrontation have
proliferated to the point where ad hoc avoidance mechanisms are inherently inadequate. To address an institutional problem, we must
seek an institutional solution.
The Interbranch Commission on Law Reform and the Judiciary
offers such a solution. The Commission would create a new avenue
for judge-legislator communication, thereby furthering the cause advanced by Coffin, Katzmann, and Tacha. At the same time, the Commission would address Smith's concerns that Congress is too quick to
accept proposals offered by a markedly self-interested judiciary by
creating a forum in which such proposals could be evaluated expertly
and dispassionately.
362

See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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2. Rulemaking Reform Proposals
Commentators have criticized the frequency with which Congress
has involved itself in procedural rulemaking in recent years?363 Consistent with the changing role of the judiciary in rulemaking as I have
described it in this Article, the 1973 Rules of Evidence episode underscored the impact of procedural rules on the enforcement of substantive fights to a Congress and public increasingly reluctant to accept
governmental decisionmakers at their word.? 4 Politicization of the
rulemaking process, as evidenced by a heightened level of congressional activity, was an inevitable consequence of the new skepticism.
Precipitous judicial rulemaking-a central concern to other commentators 36 5-is a byproduct of politicization, as the judiciary becomes
more responsive to outside calls for reform as a means to ward off
congressional intervention.3 66 The proliferation of congressionally
generated, subject-matter-specific procedural rules, yet another concern raised by still other commentators, follows naturally from the
conflation of substance and procedure that accompanied politicization
67
of the rulemaking process.3
In sum, the varied criticisms of the judiciary's role in the rulemaking process have a common origin with each other and with companion criticisms of the judiciary's role in statutory reform. In both
contexts, the judiciary's lawmaking activities have become a more visible part of the political process, and with increased visibility has come
heightened public and congressional skepticism, intervention, and criticism. Despite the fact that rulemaking and legislative lobbying are
related means by which the judiciary influences law reform, commentators have tended to treat the two as utterly separate and distinct.
This is to some extent understandable, in that when the judiciary is
acting as a rulemaker, it has more the look and feel of an administrative agency than a private lobbyist. That has led some scholars, including Professor Laurens Walker, to borrow from administrative law
363
in search of solutions to the judiciary's rulemaking woes.
363
364
365
366
haste

See supra note 7.
See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 9.
See, e.g., 23 Wright & Graham, supra note 128, § 5381.1 (Supp. 1996) (describing
with which Judicial Conference promulgated Federal Rule of Evidence 412 to avoid

congressional intercession); Mullenix, supra note 7, at 855-56 (predicting that Judicial Conference Rules Committee will be under increased pressure to promulgate rules to avoid
congressional involvement).
367 See Marcus, supra note 4, at 779 (linking retreat from transsubstantive rulemaking to
new focus on "winners and losers" in more politicized rulemaking process).
368 See Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61

Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 455,464 (1993) (drawing analogy between procedural and administra-
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Professor Walker shares my concern that the "furor" over recent
rule changes "threatens judicial control of civil rulemaking," and worries that "the expertise of federal judges may be lost as a major asset
in this process. '' 369 From Professor Walker's perspective, the problem
originated with the "vast discretion" exercised by the rulemakers.3 70
He argues that the Advisory Committee is at liberty to promulgate
rules as it sees fit, and it has done so incrementally without first considering all affected interests or the full range of available
alternatives. 37'
Professor Walker argues that in the 1970s a similar problem confronted administrative agencies, which had come under attack as serving "'not the public interest but self-interests deeply entangled with
narrow private interests."' 372 In an effort to overcome this challenge
to their credibility, notes Walker, agencies gradually changed their approach to rulemaking from an unstructured, piecemeal "incrementalist" model to a structured, systematic "comprehensive rationality
model" that culminated in an Executive Order.373
Professor Walker recommends that this Executive Order be
adapted for use by the judiciary in procedural rulemaking, so as to
require the Judicial Conference to consider the systemic impact of its
rules by gathering sufficient information, weighing costs and benefits,
and considering available alternatives to the ultimate end of maximizing social utility.3 74 A logical extension of this proposal, which Walker
advances separately, is that the Judicial Conference should ordinarily
develop empirical support for proposed rules before adopting them. 375
The net benefits, concludes Professor Walker, would be to clarify the
unique role of the Rules Advisory Committee in rulemaking and to
enhance "general satisfaction" with the rulemaking process, to the ultimate ends of "discourag[ing] participation by both the legislative and
tive rulemaking); see also Burbank, supra note 85, at 1193 (observing that "would-be reformers have followed, often without acknowledging it, the path of administrative law,"
and that in light of "the aptness of the analogy... explicit attention to the similarities of, as
well as the differences between, the two contexts may well be useful if there is to be further
reform" (footnotes omitted)).
369 Walker, supra note 368, at 459.
370 Id. at 462-63.
371 See id. at 477.
372 Id. at 472 (quoting Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92
Yale L.J. 1487, 1496-97 (1983)).
373 Id. at 473-76 (discussing Executive Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1988)). In his discussion of recent developments in administrative law,
Professor Walker relies heavily on the work of Professor Colin Diver. See generally Colin
S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 393 (1981)

(presenting an alternate way of evaluating agency decisionmaking).
374 See Walker, supra note 368, at 480-81.
375

See Walker, supra note 9, at 572.
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executive branches in rulemaking and preserv[ing] judicial
376
primacy."
Professor Walker seeks to achieve "general satisfaction," i.e., consensus, on rule reform proposals by enhancing the quality of, and
hence public confidence in, the rulemaking process and product. To
the extent that Congress responds to interest group pressure for legislative intercession because of a perception that the Rules Committee
has not formally considered available options or weighed relevant
costs and benefits, Professor Walker's proposal could make a difference. By restructuring Judicial Conference Rules Advisory Committee deliberations to ensure that relevant options and interests are
explicitly considered, his proposal creates new opportunities for consensus building within the rulemaking process itself that could reduce
the need for recourse to (and confrontations with) Congress.
Professor Walker may overstate the extent to which the Rules
Committee fails to consider a range of alternatives and interests in the
current rulemaking process, 3 7 but that does not necessarily detract
from the value of his proposal to the extent that it would dispel the
perception that the rulemakers are neither thorough enough nor sufficiently willing to consider alternatives 78 His proposal is also subject
to the criticism that it will make the rulemaking process more cumbersome and time consuming.379 To a certain extent, that may be a good
thing, given what some regard as the precipitous pace of rule reform
in recent years.380 More to the point, however, one does not have to
accept his proposal in every detail to accept the basic notion that the
integrity of the rulemaking process would be improved if the Rules
Committee was more explicitly attentive to the costs and benefits of
proposed rules and their alternatives, and relied more heavily on empirical data.
376 See Walker, supra note 368, at 489.
377 See Carrington, supra note 85, at 2119-22 (describing Rules Committee's delibera-

tions); Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 Am. U. L Rev.
1655, 1671-75 (1995) (describing seven stages of rule reform).
378 See supra note 243. Moreover, Walker makes a good argument that, at least with
respect to the recent discovery and disclosure rules, the Rules Committee did not proceed
as systematically as it should have. See Walker, supra note 368, at 458-59; see also

Burbank, supra note 9, at 844-46 (arguing that rulemaking is done in "virtual empirical
vacuum").
379 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Repealing the Law of Unintended Consequences? Com-

ment on Walker (2), 23 J. Legal Stud. 615, 616-17 (1994) ("Not only would generating and
assimilating data about likely effects of rule changes cost money and take time in itself...
[but] requiring such efforts before proceeding with most amendments could also delay
needed changes and impose a status quo bias that might even lead to efforts at bypassing a
balky process by appeals to Congress.").
3W See Burbank, supra note 9, at 841-42 (calling for moratorium on rule reform "until
such time as we know what we are doing").
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The more fundamental problem with the Walker proposal, it
seems to me, is its assumption that user groups and their legislative
representatives will reassume their traditionally deferential posture
toward judicial rulemaking if the judiciary does a better job of
rulemaking. That assumption may hold true for user groups whose
interests will be better accounted for in a more comprehensive
rulemaking proceeding and who are satisfied with the results they
achieve. But those who are not satisfied will be no less inclined to
seek congressional redress under a new and improved rulemaking
process than they were before. That is so because litigation user
groups are troubled not only by the rulemaking product and process
but also by the rulemaker. They are no longer willing to defer to judicial rulemakers, I have argued, because they read substantive implications into an increasingly broad array of "procedural" rules and do not
trust what they regard as an elitist, unaccountable, and self-interested
judiciary to protect their substantive rights in a rulemaking
proceeding.
Perhaps the ultimate difficulty is that despite certain obvious similarities between the Judicial Conference and administrative agencies
acting in their respective rulemaking capacities, there are also some
fundamental differences. Agencies-even so-called "independent"
agencies-are politically accountable in ways that the judiciary is
not.38 Unlike administrative agencies, the judiciary is an independent
branch of government. 382 To preserve the independent status of the
judiciary, judges serve for life, 383 not for a term of years or at the
pleasure of the President, as agency officials do. 314 Whereas agency
381 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, in Administrative Law Anthology
282, 293 (Thomas 0. Sargentich ed., 1994) ("[I]t is most definitely not the case that
independent agencies are insulated from political pressures. The unanimous testimony of
those who have served at the highest levels of such agencies is emphatically to the
contrary.").
382 See id. at 288 (arguing that characterizing agencies as "fourth branch" of government
"cannot be reconciled with the written Constitution"); cf. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, in Administrative
Law Anthology, supra note 381, at 300. 311 (arguing that agencies should be recognized as
fourth branch of government, while conceding that to do so requires that we "give up the
notion that [the Constitution] embodies a neat division of all government into three separate branches").
383 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour ....").
384 See Aman & Mayton, supra note 353, at 582-83 (explaining that whereas "cabinet
level officers... serve at the pleasure of the President" and are "subject to unconditional
Presidential removal powers," Congress has "often sought to insulate certain [independent
agency] officials from the executive by granting them a term of years and conditioning their
removal during that term on 'inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office'" (citation omitted)).
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officials are nominated and confirmed in light of their aptitude for
agency administration and can be discharged for mismanagement or
less, 3s judges are nominated and confirmed in light of their aptitude
for judicial office with little or no regard to their administrative skills,
and as a practical matter are removed only for criminal misconduct38 6
In short, the judiciary is insulated from majoritarian/political influence to an extent that agencies are not. As long as the modification
of substantive rights outside of the Constitution is viewed as a
majoritarian/political concern, and procedural rules are thought to
modify substantive rights, a politically insulated judiciary will remain
an inherently suspect decisionmaker, and no amount of tinkering with
the judiciary's decisionmaking process is going to convince a disaffected group or its elected representatives not to seek congressional
intercession. 3 s7 Professor Mullenix therefore concludes that all is lost
and urges us to run for our lives. "[T]he Visigoths are not at the gate,
but the lobbyists are," she warns, which "may signal the last hurrah
for Old Guard rulemaking." 38 8 In the wake of "the current trend toward politicization of the rulemaking process," she predicts that
"good questions worth debating"-such as who should make rules of
procedure and how-"will be decided by default or politics."'3 9
I hope that Professor Mullenix is too pessimistic. The judiciary's
loss of influence in rule reform is not a direct or inevitable consequence of politicization per se. Rather, politicization creates an environment in which all participants, including the judiciary, are
385 See id. at 585.
386 See Emily Field Van Tassel, Federal Judicial Ctr., Why Judges Resign: Influences on
Federal Judicial Service, 1789 to 1992, at 130 (1993) (listing seven judges removed from

office following impeachment and conviction).
387 Professor Robert Bone makes a related argument. He argues that in no-stone-leftunturned rulemaking proceedings of the type Professor Walker recommends, well-heeled
user groups will be able to influence the process by funding their own empirical research,
while poorer groups will not. Bone concludes: "A group that does not have the financial
resources to wield power before a committee dependent on access to empirical tests may
decide to take its case directly to Congress. If enough groups choose this alternative, legislation could supplant court rulemaking as the preferred method of rule reform." Robert
G. Bone, The Empirical Tin in Procedural Rulemaking: Comment on Walker (1), 23 J.
Legal Stud. 595, 613 (1994).

Burbank also writes on this point:
Procedural safeguards are, to be sure, a useful antidote to overreaching
.... Unless there is consensus about the limits of the rulemaking function,
however, it is doubtful that all the procedural safeguards in the world will prevent controversy where it counts-in Congress-because the rulemakers' reaction to controversy in the lawmaking process will necessarily continue to be ad
hoe.
Burbank, supra note 85, at 1195.
388 Mullenix, supra note 7, at 856.
389 Id.
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perceived as self-interested political actors. That perception, in turn,
gives legislators reason to devalue as unreliable the judiciary's primary
asset in the lawmaking process-its expertise-which may precipitate
a loss of influence unless legislators have some other reason to credit
the judiciary's position.
To restore and preserve public confidence in the judiciary as
rulemaker, then, what is needed is an external validation of the judiciary's rulemaking product, a buffering mechanism that could simultaneously allay concerns that judiciary-promulgated rules are selfserving and insulate the judiciary from political fallout when disappointed interest groups seek congressional review. Professor
Carrington has made such a proposal, urging the creation of an organization, the "primary function" of which would be "to organize and
orchestrate efforts to protect the rules in Congress. 390 The organization Professor Carrington envisions would be comprised of a "couple
dozen persons" who have a "substantial presence in the American Bar
Association and other bar organizations. '391 Although the organization would "use its antennae to advise the rules committees if it appears that a particular proposal is likely to arouse overwhelming
concern in Congress... [it] would not otherwise advise the rules committees on proposed changes," because the organization "would be
less able to lend institutional support" if the Conference did not accept the organization's advice. 392
As previously discussed, the judiciary has occasionally capitalized
on the lobbying efforts of other organizations, such as the American
393
Bar Association, to represent the judiciary's interests in Congress.
The Carrington proposal is, in effect, an attempt to institutionalize this
heretofore ad hoc relationship with a freestanding organization
closely tied to the bar being substituted for the bar itself.
The American Bar Association has been an effective intermediary between courts and Congress for at least two reasons. First, it has
been an independent voice validating Judicial Conference proposals
for members of Congress who might otherwise be inclined to disregard the judiciary's positions as self-interested.3 94 Second, it has been
a politically influential lobbying force with constituent and financial

390 Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 Judicature 161, 166
(1991).
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 See supra note 312 and accompanying text.

394

See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
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resources that the judiciary lacks. 395 The organization that Professor
Carrington proposes, however, would have no independent voice, being duty bound to support proposed rules. Moreover, it could exert
no useful political influence over and above that already exerted by
the bar organizations to which the entity would be tied. If the bar
enthusiastically supported or vigorously opposed a proposed rule, the
bar's political clout would dwarf that of the new organization and
render it superfluous. If, on the other hand, the bar was insufficiently
concerned to take a position, the likelihood that the rule would be so
controversial as to need the organization's political clout to secure
congressional acquiescence would seem remote. Granted, the entity
would still serve a monitoring function that the bar does not, but that
is a function already being served by the Office of Legislative and
Public Affairs within the Administrative Office of the United States
96
Courts 3
A promising alternative is to expand the jurisdiction of the Interbranch Commission on Law Reform and the Judiciary, discussed earlier, to include not only matters of statutory reform but rule reform as
well. The net effect would be to restructure the entity Professor
Carrington proposes as a tri-branch commission, rather than a lobby
group, and to empower the commission to review rules proposals and
make recommendations independent of the Judicial Conference.
Consistent with the goal of preserving the primacy of the Judicial Conference in rule reform, I would limit the Commission's role to evaluating rules proposed by the Judicial Conference and suggesting the need
for reform, without authorizing the Commission to develop significant
rules proposals independent of the Judicial Conference. To the extent
that the Commission favored a proposed rule, legislators skeptical of
the judiciary's rulemaking motives would have independent validation
of the proposals. To the extent that the Commission opposed a proposed rule, the judiciary would be put on notice that going forward
with the rule as written could provoke a confrontation in Congress
that the judiciary might or might not be willing to risk.
My proposal has at least two potential problems that Professor
Carrington's does not. First, the Commission's power to disagree with
the Judicial Conference could be interpreted as a de facto veto power
that would undercut rather than reinforce the judiciary's rulemaking
authority. To obviate this concern, the Commission's enabling statute
could include a statement of purpose, undergirded by legislative his395 See Albert P. Melone, Lawyers, Public Policy, and Interest Group Politics passim
(1977) (discussing nature and extent of American Bar Association influence in legislative
process).
396 See supra text accompanying note 67.
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tory, acknowledging that the judiciary should remain rulemaker of
primary resort and that the Commission is being established in part to
preserve public confidence in judicial rulemaking. Consistent with
that purpose, the statute should direct the Commission to employ a
deferential standard when assessing rules (as opposed to statutory)
proposals.
A second potential problem with the proposed Commission is
that it would be too cumbersome to be effective. In the case of
rulemaking, Commission scrutiny would add a layer of review to an
already time-consuming process. 397 Such concerns, while understandable, are easy to overstate. Minor statutory and rule adjustments
would not warrant Commission attention. Major rule revisions are
years in the making,398 with opportunities built into the process for
interested parties-such as the proposed Interbranch Commissionto familiarize themselves with pending proposals and communicate
their positions to the Judicial Conference Rules Committee without
causing additional delay.
The goal in reforming the rulemaking process should be to reorient existing rulemaking structures to accommodate the new judgelegislator relationship. Although I have focussed here on restructuring the role of the judge, any such effort necessarily will restructure
the role of the legislator as well. The ultimate embodiment of the
judge-legislator rulemaking relationship is the Rules Enabling Act,
and that is where Professor Burbank sees the greatest opportunity for
397 In this respect it is arguably subject to the same concerns about delay as have been
raised in response to Professor Walker's proposal that procedural rules ordinarily should
receive an additional layer of empirical support before they are promulgated. See Rowe,
supra note 379, at 616-17. A similar concern arises in the case of statutory reform, where
the Commission might not be able to review proposals rapidly enough to be of service to
Congress in the midst of a legislative session. Judge Tacha makes this point with respect to
the judiciary's ability to respond to legislative reforms in a timely fashion, with the observation that "[o]ne of the most difficult impediments to effective interbranch communication is that the issues that are the most important to the judiciary are also those that
Congress must respond to most rapidly." Tacha, supra note 358, at 1553-54. One must
remember, however, that unlike the Judicial Conference, which votes on legislative proposals semiannually, the proposed Commission would have the flexibility to meet more
regularly.
398 See McCabe, supra note 377, at 1671 (noting that enactment of rule takes two to
three years at minimum). With respect to statutory reforms, the concern would not apply
to the Commission in its proactive role as formulator of reform proposals (for it would
always be ready to defend the measures it had developed). Rather, time constraints would
become an issue only when the Commission sought to react to proposals offered by others.
As a practical matter, most significant court reform proposals of the past decade have
taken years to work their way from initial development to final passage, meaning that the
Commission ordinarily would have ample time within which to act. That the occasional
legislative proposal may still become law too quickly for the Commission to develop a
position and communicate its views to Congress does not strike me as fatal to the proposal.
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reform-with a "new treaty, the Rules Enabling Act of 1997."399 Professor Burbank's new treaty "contemplates that the branches will cooperate, with the judiciary taking the lead, in the formulation and
promulgation of reforms that would necessarily and obviously affect
substantive rights," and makes a "national commitment" to research
on civil justice.400
Professor Burbank's proposal is a logical end point that would or
could codify much of what I have proposed in this Article-including
a fixed role for the Interbranch Commission. My primary concern is
that 1997 may be too soon. For a "treaty" to be worth the paper it is
written on, the parties must be tired of war, receptive to negotiation,
and willing to abide by the terms of their agreement in letter and
spirit. The 1988 Rules Enabling Act "treaty" failed in part because
user groups and their congressional representatives had not yet tired
of interbranch war and were unready to trust the judiciary to exercise
the rulemaking authority contemplated by the 1988 amendments,
even with added checks on the judiciary's power. Congress and its
interested constituents appear no more ready to trust the judiciary
now. If the Act were amended today-consistent with Professor
Burbank's suggestions-but before other measures are implemented
to restore public confidence in the judiciary's rulemaking role, I fear
that the new law would suffer the same fate as its 1988 predecessor to
be honored in letter, but not in spirit, meaning that Congress would
not trust the judiciary to "take the lead" as the statute intended. The
odyssey of rule reform might thus target 2001 as the better date for
Rules Enabling Act reform, after the Interbranch Commission and
other reforms have had an opportunity to allay prevailing skepticism
and set the stage for meaningful and lasting reform.
CONCLUSION

Professor Lauren Robel recently observed that "[c]risis rhetoric
is enduringly popular in the discussion of the court system,"'40 a trend
that Professor Richard Marcus suspects may "reflect[ ] the difficulty of
attracting attention to the dry problems of court procedure in the absence of a crisis." 4° 2 I have avoided crisis rhetoric in this Article, despite the implications for my readership. We do, however, have a
problem on our hands, a potentially serious one. In the past generation there has been a transformation of the judiciary's role in statutory
399 Burbank, supra note 306, at 5.
400 Id.

401 Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 Ohio St. J. on Disp.
Resol. 115, 115 (1991).
402 Marcus, supra note 4, at 762.
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reform and rulemaking in which interbranch interaction has replaced
perceived isolation and delegated authority as a central feature. As
this new, more interactive judiciary has moved into the limelight, it
has become the target of post-Watergate skepticism that had previously been directed at the first and second branches alone. Whatever
constitutional, statutory, and ethical constraints there are on extrajudicial interactions with Congress, they are dwarfed by the prudential
constraint that the judiciary channel its interactions to minimize
credibility-damaging skepticism that threatens the judiciary's continued effectiveness in the lawmaking process and ultimately its integrity
in the courtroom. Consensus-building and buffering devices that the
judiciary has used in the past to avoid high-profile, credibility-threatening showdowns with Congress and litigation user groups do not
work as well now. Consensus is more difficult to achieve as court reform has become increasingly politicized, and buffering devices too
often are unavailable or avoided.
Once it is understood that the challenges now confronting the judiciary in statutory reform and rulemaking are an outgrowth of a fundamental change in our understanding of the judiciary's role in
lawmaking, it becomes clear that "one-trick pony" solutions inevitably
will yield disappointing results. Each may address a comer of the
larger problem, but none is going to be adequate by itself. As an exasperating consequence, every proposed "solution" to date-improve
interbranch communication, make the process more open, insist upon
an empirical foundation for proposed rules, impose a rulemaking moratorium, adopt a comprehensive rationality rulemaking model, create
an independent lobby group or commission-has been advanced, rejected as inadequate, and another solution substituted, in seemingly
perpetual recurrence.
Instead of evaluating each proposal in isolation, each should be
analyzed in terms of its potential contribution to a larger package of
reforms aimed at facilitating the transmission of judicial expertise to
Congress with a minimum of interbranch friction. If new proposals
are approached in this manner and modified to suit the needs of the
package-rather than rejected outright because they do not constitute
a panacea in and of themselves-we will have made real progress toward acclimating the judiciary to its new role in a new millennium.
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